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Abstract 
Although European Union has been described as a union based on values, recent years 
have seen the principles of democracy and rule of law being challenged in some of the 
member states. For the first time, the European Commission has proposed to declare a 
risk of a breach of the fundamental values of the European Union in a member state, 
addressing rule of law in Poland. If the value based union is to be maintained, the issue 
of how to ensure respect for the common values post-accession, has to be addressed.  
The aim of this research is to study the capacity of the European Commission to ensure 
the respect of the fundamental values of the European Union in its member states. A 
qualitative case study on the issue of rule of law in Poland between 2015 and 2018, is 
carried out since it has created a precedent. The author uses document analysis to look at 
the steps taken by the Commission to protect the principle of rule of law and the impact 
on Poland. The approach of Europeanisation is applied to analyse the strategy and 
obstacles in ensuring compliance. 
The results confirm the hypothesis as the relative power of the Commission decreases 
post-accession. The Commission has attempted to engage in dialogue and has applied 
negative conditionality on Poland but the situation has deteriorated. The persuasion power 
of the Commission is decreased by low sense of identity, legitimacy and credibility. 
Poland has argued the Commission has no right to intervene and the process is politically 
motivated. There are no benefits to be gained from compliance and the costs on Poland 
are not high enough because the credibility of sanctions is low.  
Based on the analysis, budgetary measures could be a way to increase the influence of the 
Commission. However, capacity building has to consider maintaining the unity of the 
European Union and preventing potential backlashes. 
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Introduction 
Since the creation of the Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Union (EU) 
has been framed as a project promoting peace and democracy in its neighbourhood 
(McCormick 2010). According to the Lisbon Treaty, it is based on values like freedom, 
democracy and rule of law. In case of candidate countries, conditionality can be used to 
evoke respect for these principles and non-compliance does little harm as the countries 
do not directly represent the EU. The relative power the EU has over its member states, 
however, is considerably lower and the costs of disrespect significantly higher. 
In recent years, the balance of power has been challenged in some of the member states 
with Poland and Hungary gaining the most attention (Schlippak and Treib 2017). After 
the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) won the parliamentary election in 2015, it has 
attempted to increase the power the government has over the judiciary. This has resulted 
in the first ever proposal by the European Commission to launch Article 7 of the Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU) on the risk of a serious breach in the fundamental values 
of the EU in a member state. These tendencies challenge the idea of a value based union 
as well as the unity and credibility of the European Union. 
The aim of this research is to study the capacity of the European Commission to ensure 
the respect of the fundamental values of the EU in its member states. While the influence 
of the EU over its candidate countries has been widely covered in literature (e.g. Grabbe 
2001; Héritier 2005; Scherpereel 2010), the power remaining post-accession has not 
gained as much scholarly attention. The paper aims to contribute to this effort by looking 
at the principle of rule of law in Poland. The hypothesis tested is that the capacity of the 
European Commission to ensure respect for the fundamental values of the EU decreases 
after a country has joined the Union.  
To engage with the hypothesis, the approach of Europeanisation is applied. 
Europeanisation studies rule transfer from the EU to nation states, also, regarding values 
(Bulmer 2008; Radaelli 2000). The approach allows to analyse the preconditions for rule 
adoption and the capacity of the EU to evoke such change. The main authors used in 
creating the theoretical framework for the research, are Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich
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Sedelmeier. Their models of Europeanisation (2005), inspired by the works of Tanja 
Börzel and Thomas Risse (2000, 2003), are applied to analyse the logic of action of the 
parties. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier also discuss factors conducing and hindering 
rule adoption, which are applied in the paper to explain the capacity of the European 
Commission to protect the fundamental values. 
A qualitative case study on the issue of rule of law in Poland is carried out. The case study 
analyses the steps taken by the Commission to protect the fundamental values of the EU 
and their impact on Poland. First, a timeline of key moments is composed by looking at 
which steps of Poland have triggered a response from the Commission. Second, the power 
of the Commission over Poland is assessed by analysing the dynamics between the actors 
and whether changes have been evoked. Lastly, models of Europeanisation by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) are applied to explain the strategies and obstacles 
in rule transfer. Official statements and documents released by the European Commission 
and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from October 19, 2015, to April 1, 2018, are 
used. The sample is composed of 62 documents, 31 from both parties. 
The paper is divided into two chapters – theoretical and empirical. The theoretical chapter 
first covers the concept and models of Europeanisation, next, it moves onto the context 
of values and the capacity of the EU. It gives an overview of the conferral of powers to 
the Commission and the main criticism and proposals regarding the protection of values. 
In the second chapter, a qualitative case study is carried out based on the theory 
introduced in the first chapter. The analysis is divided into three parts based on the steps 
of analysis described above. 
The research is solely focused on the actions of the Commission. In order to get a more 
comprehensive picture of the capacity of the EU as a whole, the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union should be included. Moreover, monitoring Polish 
media would contribute to analysing the effect of socialisation since it would allow to 
assess the influence of the EU on domestic debate. It should be noted that the goal of the 
paper is to study the dynamics of action and reaction between the actors, it does not aim 
to offer a legal analysis of the judicial reforms in Poland.  
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1. Theoretical framework 
The chapter sets out the theoretical foundation on which the research is based on. It gives 
an overview of the literature on Europeanisation and its relevance in the context of 
protecting the fundamental values of the EU. First, the general concept and process of 
Europeanisation is covered. Next, the models of Europeanisation based on the main actor 
and logic of action are introduced, as well as the main factors hindering and evoking 
Europeanisation. The third subchapter turns to the issue of safeguarding the fundamental 
values of the EU and how rule adoption is supported by EU capacity building through the 
conferral of powers to the Commission. The last subchapter gives an overview of the most 
prevalent criticism and proposals on the capacity of the EU in protecting its fundamental 
values. 
1.1. The concept of Europeanisation 
Europeanisation has a wide array of definitions and it is often used alongside other 
theories on European integration or international relations (e.g. Börzel and Risse 2000; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Thus, Europeanisation has been described as an 
approach, rather than a full-fledged theory (Bulmer 2008; Featherstone 2003). 
Europeanisation describes the impact the European institutions and policies have on 
domestic polities, politics and policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 5). Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2005, 7) have defined Europeanisation as “a 
process in which states adopt EU rules“. Rules can range from regulations in concrete 
policy areas to rules on the political process and can be both, formal and informal 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 7). The concept of Europeanisation is also used 
for analysing how these transfers are reflected by the delegation of power to the 
supranational level (Bulmer 2008; Olsen 2002). Case studies mostly involve member 
states (e.g. Börzel and Risse 2003) or candidate countries (e.g. Harmsen and Wilson 2000; 
Olsen 2002). 
There have been several approaches for categorising different types of Europeanisation. 
According to Johan P. Olsen (2002, 923–924), Europeanisation can explain five 
processes: 1) changes in external boundaries, 2) developing institutions at the European 
level, 3) central penetration of national systems of governance, 4) exporting forms of 
political organisation within and outside the EU, 5) Europeanisation as a political 
unification project – developing capacity of the EU. Kevin Featherstone (2003) has 
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differentiated four categories of Europeanisation, namely, Europeanisation as 1) a 
historical process, 2) a transnational cultural diffusion, 3) an institutional adaption, 4) an 
adaption of policies and policy processes. 
This paper will follow the approach by Simon Bulmer (2008) who distinguishes two 
broad processes 1) Europeanisation as the transformation of policy, institutions, rules or 
norms and 2) Europeanisation as European capacity building (Bulmer 2008, 47). 
Bulmer’s approach summarises the study of Europeanisation and underlines that the 
changes do not only take place on the national level but also have an effect on the 
supranational level and, as a result, lead to a reshuffle of power. Moreover, the two 
processes are related since European capacity building can lead to a transformation of 
rules on a domestic level.  
Rule adoption varies by extent and the motivation of the domestic actors. Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2005, 8) distinguish three forms of rule adoption – formal, behavioural 
and communicative or discursive. In the case of formal adoption, EU rules are simply 
introduced into national law. Therefore, the adoption takes place de jure. In the 
behavioural model, change also takes place de facto and the behaviour is rule-conforming. 
Discursive adoption represents two opposite poles in the extent of rule adoption, either 
the rule is truly internalised and referenced positively or the adoption is simply rhetorical 
and used strategically (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 8). 
Europeanisation is complex and rarely takes place according to a universal model. The 
regularity, extent and location of change vary and result in an asymmetry (Featherstone 
2003, 4). Moreover, convergence and homogenisation are always somewhat different 
since domestic actors interpret rule adoption according to national institutions, traditions, 
identity and resources (Radaelli and Pasquier 2008; Olsen 2002). Tanja Börzel and 
Thomas Risse (2003) have set out two preconditions for Europeanisation to take place. 
First, there must be an incompatibility between the institutions, policies or rules on the 
European and state level, they call it “a misfit”. The misfit evokes an adaptational pressure 
which may result in domestic change, yet, not necessarily (Börzel and Risse 2003). The 
bigger the misfit, the greater the pressure for rule adoption (Börzel and Risse 2000, 5). In 
addition to a misfit, factors which respond to the pressure, such as responsible political 
actors or institutions, must exist to elicit the change (Börzel and Risse 2003, 58). 
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1.2. Models of Europeanisation 
There are two main approaches for explaining the motivation for Europeanisation. The 
first, logic of consequentialism, follows from rational institutionalism and the second, 
logic of appropriateness, follows from sociological institutionalism (Börzel and Risse 
2000, 2003).  According to rational institutionalism, actors are rational and goal-oriented 
and base their actions on a cost-benefit analysis to choose an alternative which maximises 
their benefits (Börzel and Risse 2000, 6). Hence, logic of consequentialism argues that 
Europeanisation is pursued because it is necessary for achieving certain goals of the state. 
According to the logic of appropriateness, the change is a result of socialisation and 
collective learning (Börzel and Risse 2000, 2). The theory of socialisation suggests that 
institutional conditions, formal and informal rules of an organisation affect the behaviour 
of the members up to a point where the norms about appropriateness are internalised as 
part of the self (Beyers 2010, 909). The actors base their actions on what they think is 
expected from them and what is socially acceptable (Börzel and Risse 2000, 7). Applied 
to the EU, the logic of appropriateness suggests that member states redefine their norms 
and values after European norms due to involvement in European venues and formats of 
cooperation 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) describe three alternative mechanisms for 
Europeanisation based on the principal actor and the logic of rule adoption (see Table 1). 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier studied Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC) as candidate countries, but the same approach can be applied to member states, 
bearing in mind the variation in the EU’s “tool box”, mainly the absence of conditionality 
as the carrot of membership has ceased to be relevant. The first distinction in the model                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
is the principal actor. EU-driven models refer to situations were rule adoption would not 
have happened without the interference of the EU, whereas in CEEC-driven models, the 
state takes the initiative. In the CEEC-driven lesson-drawing model, the tools the EU has 
remain unimportant since rule adoption is seen as necessary and appropriate in the 
domestic context. Status quo is dissatisfying and the strategies of the EU do not have a 
significant role in evoking change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 8–10). 
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Table 1. Alternative mechanisms of Europeanisation. 
Source: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005. 
Logic of rule adoption explains the strategies and measures used to enforce rule adoption 
in EU-driven models. The model of external incentives follows the logic of consequence. 
Bargaining takes place and the EU offers rewards and sanctions to tip the scales for the 
cost-benefit analysis on the national level. The governments adopt the rules in case the 
rewards offered by the EU exceed the domestic costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005, 10–12). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) define four factors which increase 
the likeliness of rule adoption. These can be applied to member states with some 
modifications.  
First, determinacy of conditions, meaning the rule is clear and formal. This gives an 
indication of what needs to be changed and prevents using rules to one’s own advantage. 
Second, rewards are quick and significant. In case of member states, sanctions can have 
the same effect. Third, credibility of conditionality, which means that 1) the EU itself 
would not carry high costs by the use of incentives, 2) the EU is consistent and coherent 
in its actions, 3) there are no third parties offering comparable benefits, 4) the EU can 
monitor compliance. Lastly, rule adoption is more likely if there are few veto players and 
low adoption costs, such as opportunity costs, welfare and power losses (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 12–17).  
In case of social learning, logic of appropriateness applies and the EU aims to persuade 
the nation states that its rules are legitimate and pursuing them is right in the normative 
sense. To increase the persuasion power and likeliness of rule adoption, legitimacy, 
identity and domestic resonance are essential (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 18–
20). For a rule to be legitimate it must be clear, adopted legitimately and applied 
consistently. Legitimacy is increased if other international actors follow the same 
principles (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 18–19). Sense of identity means there 
is a level of aspiration and the EU is seen as a collective whose recognition is valued and 
pursued (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 19). Lastly, resonance means that the 
 Logic of rule adoption 
Principal actor in rule adoption 
process 
Logic of consequence Logic of 
appropriateness 
EU-driven External incentives model Social learning model 
CEEC-driven Lesson-drawing model Lesson-drawing model 
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rule can be easily adopted to the domestic context and there are no conflicting rules 
derived from the domestic political or legal culture (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005, 20). 
1.3. Power conferred to the European Union in the context of values 
Europeanisation not only changes the formal institutions and policies but also has an 
effect on the values and discourse in the member states (Radaelli 2000, 13). According to 
Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the EU is “founded on the values 
of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”. These values 
are meant to be shared by the member states. However, there is no way to terminate a 
membership of a country if it does not comply with the rules it has agreed to. Under the 
current treaties, the EU cannot expel its members, countries can only leave voluntarily. 
Hence, whereas EU has a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis candidate countries, after 
accession the relative power of the EU decreases noticeably as exclusion cannot be used 
as a credible deterrence.   
The EU mainly uses political tools to protect its fundamental values. There is a 
Commissioner responsible for co-ordination on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and a 
special article introduced into the TEU for protecting the values stated in Article 2. Since 
2014, the First Vice-President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans is responsible for 
co-ordinating the Commission’s activities in the area of rule of law and fundamental 
rights (Blauberger and Kelemen 2017, 324). This allows the Commission to publicly 
assert pressure in case there is a threat of a violation. The most powerful tool the EU has 
is evoking Article 7 of the TEU, which allows imposing sanctions on a member state if 
there is a consistent breach of the values stated in Article 2. The sanctions can go as far 
as suspending the voting rights of the member state in the Council of the European Union.  
There are three main steps in the process of evoking Article 7. Under paragraph 1, the 
Commission, the European Parliament or 1/3 of the member states can issue a reasoned 
proposal for triggering Article 7 in case there is a risk for a serious breach of the values 
in Article 2. After hearing out the respective member state, the Council can decide the 
risk to be apparent if 4/5 of the member states and the Parliament agree. Under paragraph 
2, the existence of serious and persistent breach can be determined by a unanimous 
decision of the European Council while also having the consent of the Parliament. After 
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the determination under paragraph 2 has been made, rights of the member state can be 
suspended by the Council under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). All obligations 
remain binding on the member state. The measures can be changed or revoked under 
QMV (Article 7 of the TEU). Throughout the process, the Parliament needs a 2/3 majority 
(Article 354 of the TFEU). 
Sedelmeier (2017) argues that social pressure and persuasion should be the main tool of 
the EU as it has proven efficient in the past. He highlights that in order for social pressure 
to be effective, it has to be consistent, impartial, public and transparent (Sedelmeier 2017, 
344). The Commission has tried to make the dialogue with troubling member states more 
transparent. In 2014, the Commission presented a framework for addressing the issue of 
rule of law, making the process and dialogue leading up to Article 7, official. The 
framework differentiates assessment, recommendation and follow-up. First, the 
Commission collects data on the potential breach. Based on the investigation, it can 
initiate a dialogue with the member state by sending a Rule of Law Opinion. Next, the 
Commission gives recommendations for solving the identified problem within a fixed 
time limit. Lastly, if the follow up shows no improvement, the Article 7 procedure can be 
initiated by the Commission (European Commission 2014). 
In addition to political measures, judicial measures can be used as they offer legal clarity 
and might be perceived as more legitimate. According to the Treaties, if the Commission 
considers a member state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, it can deliver 
a reasoned opinion. If the state does not address the concerns in the time frame set by the 
Commission, the matter can be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(Article 258 of the TFEU). So far, the values stated in the TEU remain too vague and 
would need to be operationalised by secondary legislation for using the infringement 
procedure (Blauberger and Kelemen 2017, 326). Since 2013, the Commission also 
publishes an annual EU Justice Scoreboard which uses different indicators to assess the 
judicial systems in the member states, including an evaluation on judicial independence 
(European Commission 2013).   
1.4. Criticism and proposals 
The criticism towards the capacity of the EU to respond to member states falling back on 
the fundamental values can be summed up in lack of credibility, as the main concerns 
covered in literature are effectiveness and partisan politics. There are also other issues, 
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for example, Kochenov (2013, 148–149) has turned criticism towards the values in 
general, claiming they have not been provided with enough content, being mostly 
declarative and aimed for external consumption. It has also been referred there is no 
responsible political actor for drawing attention to these issues nor a common political 
space or platform for political debate (Müller 2015, 150).   
Political measures have been criticised for being difficult to launch or likely to prove 
ineffective. Blauberg and Kelemen (2017) point out evoking Article 7 is politically 
unlikely as it can be easily blocked. If the member state in question can find at least one 
ally in the Council, the decision will not pass. European Parliament has discussed 
addressing this concern by making Article 2 a legal base for infringement proceedings 
and legislative measures. In this case, it would be decided under Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure (Blauberger and Kelemen 2017, 326). The Rule of Law Framework has been 
criticised for being too naive in assuming it would be effective on illiberal states 
(Kochenov and Pech 2015). Rhetorical measures and public critique may be insufficient 
towards antidemocratic or unconstitutional countries since the opposition cannot use the 
external pressure for undermining the government (Grabbe 2014; Sedelmeier 2017).  
Ulrich Sedelmeier (2017) has highlighted the role of partisan politics in the European 
Parliament. It hinders political party groups to vote against their colleagues. In addition, 
parties which do not hold European integration or liberal democracy in such a high regard, 
may hamper sanctioning uncompliant member states for ideological reasons (Sedelmeier 
2017, 340). Sedelmeier claims partisan politics can contribute to enforcing confrontation 
if the European level becomes an extension of national rivalries, referring to Polish Civic 
Platform and the Law and Justice Party (PiS), belonging to European People’s Party and 
the European Conservatives and Reformists, respectively (Sedelmeier 2017, 341). 
On the other hand, Blauberger and Kelemen (2017) have argued relying on judicial tools 
too much would politicize the EU judiciary and leave political leaders not responsible for 
addressing democratic backsliding. Under the current system, the Commission has been 
criticised for prosecuting infringements selectively and only launching cases it believes 
it can win. Thus, politically sensitive conflicts are avoided in order not to lose credibility 
or give a feeling there was no breach simply because the vote failed (Blauberger and 
Kelemen 2017; Sedelmeier 2017). 
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There are three main proposals for increasing the reaction capacity of the EU for 
preventing democratic back sliding. These include 1) creating a separate body for 
monitoring, 2) widening the capacity to address the issues judicially and 3) increasing 
monitoring in the current framework (Müller 2015; Scheppele 2013; Sedelmeier 2017). 
Müller has proposed creating a “Copenhagen Commission”, composed of legal experts 
and respected statesmen that would investigate possible breaches regarding the 
fundamental values of the EU. The body should be able to trigger a procedure short of 
Article 7 to send a message. Based on the proposal by the Copenhagen Commission, the 
European Commission would also be required to freeze pay-outs or impose fines on the 
member state. Müller (2015, 150–151) also proposes adding a clause of expulsion to 
Article 7 for deterrence. 
Instead of creating new bodies, current systems could be developed further. Kim Lane 
Scheppele (2013) has proposed giving the Commission the power to gather separate 
breaches of fundamental values into one infringement procedure. It would allow for the 
Court of Justice to see a pattern of a worrying behaviour instead of some elements of it, 
and it could provide the Court with a better understanding of the judicial context. Also, it 
would prevent the Commission from cherry-picking the cases it estimates to win 
(Scheppele 2013).  Sedelmeier (2017) proposes including the issue of fundamental values 
into the annual Justice Scoreboard reports, which so far have focused more on the 
efficiency of national judiciaries. He argues consistent monitoring would increase 
transparency and legitimacy by helping to operationalise the values stated in Article 2 
(Sedelmeier 2017, 347).   
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2. Empirical analysis 
This chapter applies the theory of Europeanisation on the case of Poland by carrying out 
a qualitative case study. The chapter is divided into four subchapters. The first part 
introduces the methodology of the case study. The second gives an overview of the steps 
taken by the Commission. The third part analyses the impact the Commission’s actions 
have had. In the fourth subchapter, the models and preconditions of Europeanisation by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier are applied on the case to offer explanations.   
2.1. Data and methodology 
To test the hypothesis on whether the capacity of the European Commission to ensure the 
respect for the fundamental values of the EU decreases after a country has joined the 
Union, a qualitative case study of Poland’s rule of law process is carried out. The aim is 
to study the interaction of the two main aspects of Europeanisation – capacity building of 
the EU and rule transfer from the EU by assessing how the powers conferred to the 
Commission enable it to evoke rule adoption in the member state in the context of 
fundamental values. This is studied by analysing the narrative of the formal 
communication between the European Commission and Poland on the issue of rule of law 
in Poland, from 2015 to 2018. The case study assesses the transitive dynamics of the 
process by analysing the actions and reactions of the parties as well as the narratives used. 
The analysis engages with the hypothesis by applying the models and preconditions of 
Europeanisation by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) to assess the strategies and 
obstacles in rule adoption.   
Poland is chosen for the case study because it has created a precedent in terms of 
safeguarding the values of the EU in the member states. It is the only country that has 
been a subject of a proposal for launching the Article 7 procedure. After winning the 
general election in 2015, the governing Law and Justice Party (PiS) started judiciary 
reforms that the European Commission has seen as a threat to the principle of rule of law 
– one of the fundamental values explicitly mentioned in the treaties. Since this is the first 
time evoking the Article 7 procedure is proposed, it gives ground to analyse the capacity 
of the EU and the reasons why other measures to influence Poland have been insufficient. 
Due to the formal course of action, the developments are well documented and provide 
data for carrying out the case study.  
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The actions of the European Commission are analysed to refer to the capacity and role of 
the EU since Commission is the “guardian” of the Treaties and, hence, responsible for 
monitoring adherence to the fundamental values. The Commission has been in formal 
dialogue with Poland and is the most relevant EU institution in the process. The European 
Parliament has been involved by expressing its concern on the rule of law in Poland, 
organising formal debates on the topic and issuing a resolution on Poland. The matter has 
also been discussed in the Council of the European Union. Yet, the role of the European 
Parliament and of the Council remain beyond the scope of this study due to limit 
restrictions. 
The period under study is between October 19, 2015, and April 1, 2018. The starting date 
marks the day of the election to the Sejm – the lower house of the Polish Parliament. The 
period ends with March 2018, since March 20 was the deadline given to Poland by the 
Commission to adopt changes before Article 7 is launched. By extending the period under 
study by ten days, it is possible to see the interaction for some time after the deadline. 
The process is ongoing and it is not possible to define an endpoint for Europeanisation, 
however, for the purpose of analysis the boundaries must be set. This period is considered 
to be long enough as there has been time for dynamics to establish and there is enough 
data to carry out the case study.  
The analysis is based on Simon Bulmer’s (2008) definition of Europeanisation and 
focuses on the capacity of the European Union in evoking transfers of norms and values. 
The case study is carried out in three steps. First, the key moments in the process are 
defined to build a timeline of the events. This is done by looking at what steps by Poland 
have caused concern regarding the respect for the principle of rule of law and how has 
the Commission reacted. Next, the impact of these actions is assessed by analysing the 
dynamics of action and reaction, thus, how Poland has responded to the measures taken 
by the Commission and what narratives have the actors used to explain their actions. 
Lastly, the models of Europeanisation by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) are 
applied (see Table 2) to explain the strategies and possible reasons for compliance or non-
compliance. The models provide a framework to analyse the strategies and logic of action 
of the Commission and the Polish Government. In addition, the existence of the 
preconditions of Europeanisation by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier are analysed to 
look for possible obstacles hindering rule transfer.  
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Table 2. Main features of the models of Europeanisation. 
MECHANISM OF EUROPEANISATION 
External incentives model Social learning model Lesson-drawing model 
 Commission-driven 
 logic of 
consequence 
 bargaining 
 cost-benefit 
analysis 
 rewards 
 sanctions 
 
 Commission-driven 
 logic of 
appropriateness 
 dialogue 
 persuasion 
 proving legitimacy 
of rule 
 normative arguments 
 driven by Poland 
 both logics applicable 
 domestic debate 
 cost-benefit analysis or 
normative arguments 
 role of Commission 
unimportant 
 dissatisfaction with the 
status quo 
Source: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005). 
Primary sources are used to carry out the research. Official documents released by the 
European Commission and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are used to analyse the 
narratives used by the actors. The data provided by official sources of both parties will be 
used in order to avoid biased coverage. The European Commission Press Release 
Database is used from the side of the EU. A search is conducted with the keyword 
“Poland” in the period under study, hence from October 19, 2015 to April 1, 2018. Results 
are manually checked and all documents referring to rule of law are included. In addition, 
the original Rule of Law Recommendations and the Reasoned Proposal by the 
Commission were analysed. In total, 31 documents were included in the sample (see 
Appendix 1). 
For Poland, the same is done on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland 
using the keyword “European Commission”. The database of the Foreign Ministry is used 
since it represents the Polish position and issues documents in English. Media coverage 
is excluded from the selection because it is not available for the Commission. Annual 
overviews on the priorities of Polish foreign policy are also analysed as they address the 
dialogue with the Commission, reflect the Polish position towards the EU and give an 
insight into the reasoning presented in domestic debate. Likewise, 31 documents 
remained in the sample (see Appendix 2).  
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The documents are organised according to the template below (see Table 3). The sample 
for the Commission is composed of speeches, fact sheets and press releases, of which, 
weekly meetings of the College of the Commissioners are differentiated. The Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not differentiate between document types; this is done 
by the author while compiling the sample. The documents are differentiated into letters, 
speeches, statements and meetings where the latest refers to statements about meetings or 
visits. In addition, most important keywords of the document are indicated.  
Table 3. Template for organising the sample.  
Date Type Title Keywords Reference in text Available at 
      
Using qualitative methods offers the most relevant insight into the dynamics between the 
actors. Especially, since preventing selection bias is considered when composing the 
sample. As the case under study has created a precedent and the scope of research is 
limited, this approach is considered more appropriate than using comparative methods. 
However, focusing the analysis only to the Commission, might limit the explanatory 
power of the research. In order to get a comprehensive overview of the effects of EU 
membership on the protection of values and assess the role of partisan politics on the 
matter, further research involving the actions of the European Parliament and the Council 
of European Union, is needed. Likewise, the sample should be widened to include the 
domestic dimension to better analyse the effect of socialisation. It is possible there would 
be added value if all the letters exchanged by the parties would be included. Yet, the aim 
of this research is to study the capacity of the EU and this also means how the process 
and the actions of the EU are perceived in public, thus, research based on public sources 
remains relevant.  
2.2. Key moments in the process of rule of law 
The rule of law process between the European Commission and Poland started with 
concerns about the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The issue dates back to the previous 
parliament of Poland, which nominated five judges to be appointed to the Constitutional 
Tribunal two weeks before the next general election in October 2015 (Table 4, see 
Appendix 3 for a detailed overview). The term of two of the judges was supposed to start 
during the mandate of the next Sejm, making the two nominations unconstitutional. The 
next Sejm, elected on October 19, 2015, amended the Law on Constitutional Tribunal in 
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an accelerated procedure, annulled all nominations by the previous Sejm and nominated 
five new judges by the beginning of December (European Commission 2016a). Both, the 
nomination of the two judges in October and the nominations of the new judges in 
December, were judged invalid by the Tribunal itself on December 3 and December 9, 
respectively (European Commission 2016a).   
Table 4. Main actions and reactions in the rule of law process.  
Action by Poland Reaction by the 
Commission 
 7th term of the Sejm nominates five judges to the 
Constitutional Tribunal (CT), two to start after the 
election. 
 All nominations by the previous Sejm annulled by the 8th 
term of Sejm, five new judges nominated. 
 CT rules two nominations by the previous and three by 
the current Sejm invalid. 
 Sejm amends the Law on the CT, which, according to the 
Commission, affects the functioning and independence 
of the CT. 
First letter from 
Timmermans. 
 Law on CT enters into force before the opinion of the 
Venice Commission has been submitted.  
Rule of Law 
Framework initiated. 
 CT rules law on CT to be unconstitutional, judgement 
not published by the government. 
Rule of Law Opinion. 
 Law on CT approved, not removing the concerns of 
COM. 
First Rule of Law 
Recommendation. 
 CT finds provisions of law from 22 July 
unconstitutional, judgement not published.  
 Number of CT judgements published but not the ones 
concerning the CT. 
 President signs three new laws. 
 President appoints an Acting President of the CT who is 
elected President of the CT a day later. 
Second Rule of Law 
Recommendation. 
 Reform of the judiciary announced. 
 President vetoes two laws, signs Law on the Ordinary 
Courts Organisation 
Third Rule of Law 
Recommendation, 
threat of Article 7. 
 Retirement age of judges to be based on gender. 
 Increased discretionary power for prolongation of 
mandates of judges granted to the Minister of Justice. 
Infringement 
procedure 
 Minister of Justice dismissing court presidents and vice-
presidents. 
 Laws previously vetoed by the President amended and 
adopted. 
Reasoned proposal for 
Article 7(1), fourth 
Rule of Law 
Recommendation. 
Sources: European Commission Press Release Database, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Poland. 
20 
 
Adopting an amendment for the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal on December 22 
initiated the first response by the Commission on December 23, 2015. Vice-President 
Frans Timmermans sent a letter to the Polish Government inquiring about the steps taken 
in response to the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal on December 3 and December 9. 
Timmermans expressed hope that the amending law will not enter into force before its 
effect on the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal is verified. He suggested working 
with the European Commission for Democracy through Law –the Venice Commission– 
on the matter (European Commission 2016b). The next day, Poland requested an opinion 
from the Venice Commission (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland – Polish 
MFA 2015a). The Government published the law less than a week later without waiting 
for the opinion (European Commission 2016a).  
In January 2016, considering how Polish Government had ignored the concerns of the 
European and Venice Commission as well as the judgements by the Constitutional 
Tribunal, the College of Commissioners held a first orientation debate on the rule of law 
in Poland. The College expressed its concern on the Constitutional Tribunal emphasizing 
1) the issue on the nomination of judges, 2) non-compliance with judgements of the 
Tribunal and 3) measures taken to affect the functioning of the Tribunal, such as, 
shortening the term of the President and Vice-President with an automatic end to the 
current terms or raising the attendance quorum and majority needed for passing a 
judgement for constitutional review of legislation (European Commission 2016a). The 
College mandated Vice-President Frans Timmermans to start a dialogue with the Polish 
Government under the Rule of Law Framework (European Commission 2016c).  
After the orientation debate, numerous meetings took place and letters were exchanged. 
Timmermans personally met the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Justice, Deputy 
Prime Minister and President of the Constitutional Tribunal in Warsaw (European 
Commission 2016d; Polish MFA 2016a). On March 9, 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal 
ruled the law of December 22 to be unconstitutional but the judgement was not published 
in the Official Journal of the Government, leaving it with no legal effect (European 
Commission 2016e).  
As no satisfactory results had been achieved, on June 1, 2016, a Rule of Law Opinion 
was published by the Commission. It referred to a “crisis of Constitutional Tribunal” 
again, referring to the appointment of judges and the functioning of the Tribunal in the 
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light of non-publication. Additionally, the Commission highlighted the lack of 
constitutional review resulting from these issues. Especially having in mind that several 
laws, found to be “particularly sensitive” by the Commission, such as the Media Law, the 
new Civil Service Act and the Law on the Police and Public Prosecution Office, were 
adopted in an accelerated procedure (European Commission 2016e). Despite the Opinion 
and offers by the Commission to help in the legislative process, the Law on Constitutional 
Tribunal was approved on July 22, 2016. This triggered publishing the first Rule of Law 
Recommendation on July 27, 2016 (European Commission 2016f). In addition to the 
three issues mentioned in the Opinion, new provisions, such as the role of the Public 
Prosecutor-General and the postponement of deliberations, caused concern to the 
Commission (European Commission 2016g). 
The Polish Government did not agree with the Recommendation in its response (Polish 
MFA 2016b). The intensive adoption of legislation continued, in addition, the President 
of the Republic Andrzej Duda appointed an acting President of the Constitutional 
Tribunal who had been nominated by the Sejm. The next day, the acting President 
convened a General Assembly meeting where she was elected President, although only 6 
of the 15 judges participated in the vote (European Commission 2017a). As a result, on 
December 21, the second Rule of Law Recommendation was issued. In addition to three 
new recommendations, all previous were repeated. Several provisions were in conflict 
with the earlier ruling of the Tribunal, for instance, on the selection and role of its 
President. The Commission also expressed concern about the statements of the 
Government that were undermining the Constitutional Tribunal. For the first time, the 
threat of launching Article 7 was mentioned (European Commission 2016h).  
In July 2017, motivated by four new legislative acts, the Commission went ahead and 
published the third Rule of Law Recommendation, despite the fact that two laws on the 
judiciary had been vetoed by President Duda (European Commission 2017b). In his 
statement, Frans Timmermans expressed that the new laws increased the systemic threat 
to the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. He claimed the reforms would make 
judges “serve at the pleasure of the political leaders and be dependent upon them from 
appointment to their pension” (European Commission 2017c). Timmermans emphasized 
three reforms: 1) judges of the National Council for the Judiciary would be named by the 
Sejm, instead of by judges, 2) mandate of all current judges of the Council would be 
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prematurely terminated and 3) the Minister of Justice would have the power to appoint 
and dismiss presidents of courts without a specific criterion and without having to give 
explanations (European Commission 2017c). 
In parallel, the Commission opted for judicial tools by launching an infringement 
procedure against Poland on the basis of gender discrimination and independence of the 
judiciary under the new powers of the Minister of Justice (European Commission 2017d). 
The letter of Formal Notice was followed by a Reasoned Proposal for infringement 
procedure about one and a half months later (European Commission 2017e). 
After the Polish Minister of Justice started exercising his power to dismiss court 
presidents and vice presidents, dismissing 24 and appointing 32 and following the 
adoption of two new laws on the Supreme Court and National Council of Judiciary, the 
tension reached its peak. On December 20, 2017, the Commission issued a Reasoned 
Proposal for Article 7, together with the fourth Rule of Law Recommendation (European 
Commission 2017f). The Commission claimed the 13 consecutive laws adopted during 
the previous two years gave the legislative and executive bodies power to interfere with 
the composition and functioning of different bodies in the judicial system. As a 
consequence of the rapid pace of the reform, there was no time for consultation with all 
stakeholders (European Commission 2017g). It emphasized that 40 % of the Supreme 
Court judges would be forced to retirement and the new judges would be appointed on 
the recommendation of the “largely politically appointed” National Council of Judiciary 
(European Commission 2017a). The deadline for a response to prevent the Commission 
from moving forward with the proposal was set on March 20, 2018.  
On March 7, 2018, the Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister published a White Paper 
on the Reform of Polish Judiciary. It outlined the reforms and their motivation claiming 
there was no divergence from the judiciary systems of other member states and that the 
proposal for launching Article 7 was unfounded (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister 
2018a). The same was reiterated in the official response to the proposal (Polish MFA 
2018a). There have been no official statements on how the process will continue.  
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2.3. Impact of the Commission on Poland 
The action taken by the European Commission has not had much impact on Poland. 
Although Poland has addressed some concerns, the main issues have remained the same 
over the years. Moreover, with the adoption of the additional legislative acts, the 
Commission has expressed “the situation has continuously deteriorated” (European 
Commission 2017a). The criticism has widened and involves other issues than the 
Constitutional Tribunal. In the Reasoned Proposal, the Commission has also expressed 
concern about issues like 1) the dismissal and compulsory retirement of current Supreme 
Court judges, 2) the power to prolong the mandate of Supreme Court judges, 3) the 
introduction of extraordinary appeal which can overturn previous judgements, 4) the 
composition of the National Council of the Judiciary, 5) the retirement age and power to 
prolong the mandate of judges in ordinary courts (European Commission 2017a). 
There have been small positive changes after almost every measure taken by the 
Commission, however, they remain symbolic (see Table 5). The decision of President 
Duda to veto the two laws in July 2017, reflects the political pressure put on the domestic 
actors by the Commission (European Commission 2017h). In a way, the President acted 
as a change agent. Yet, considering the extent of the issues covered by the Commission, 
the concessions represent a small minority and have only a symbolic effect on the whole 
judicial reform. This was evident when the Government published the rulings of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, but not the judgements on the constitutionality of the Tribunal 
itself (European Commission 2016i). The fact that none of the official recommendations 
have been followed upon gives ground to assume that the positive trends are not a direct 
response to the measures from Brussels, but a result of domestic debate. Still, 
characteristically to rhetoric rule adoption, adjustments have been highlighted by Warsaw 
to demonstrate its good will. Poland claimed the presidential vetoes prove that “Poland is 
open to dialogue with critics of the reforms” (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister 
2018a). 
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Table 5. Impact of the action by the Commission. 
Sources: European Commission Press Release Database, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Poland. 
 
Measure by the 
Commission 
Following steps by Poland 
First letter from 
Timmermans. 
 Opinion requested from the Venice Commission. 
 Dialogue started. 
Rule of Law 
Framework launched  
 Expert group composed in the Sejm to prepare a new law on 
the CT. 
Rule of Law Opinion.  CT attendance quorum decreased from 13 to 11. 
 2/3 majority replaced with simple majority. 
 President of CT may order to halve the delay for hearings. 
 Issue with disciplinary proceedings solved (reintroduced later). 
First Rule of Law 
Recommendation. 
 No recommended action addressed. 
 In official response, no new measures announced to alleviate 
concerns. 
 21 CT judgments from April 2016 to July 2016, published. 
 5 articles removed (referral to full bench, handling of cases in 
chronological order, postponement of deliberations, possibility 
of the Public Prosecutor-General to prevent examination of 
cases, transitional provisions for pending cases). 
Second Rule of Law 
Recommendation. 
 No recommended action addressed. 
 In official response, no new measures announced to alleviate 
concerns. 
 President Duda refers law on the Supreme Court and on the 
National Council for the Judiciary back to the Sejm. 
Third Rule of Law 
Recommendation, 
threat of Article 7 (1). 
 No recommended action addressed. 
 Role of the President increased for deciding on the legitimacy 
of judges. 
 Automatic dismissal of Supreme Court judges removed. 
 Members of the National Council of the Judiciary need a 3/5 
majority to be appointed. 
Letter of Formal Notice 
for infringement. 
 Not available. 
Reasoned proposal in 
infringement 
procedure. 
 Same retirement age for male and female judges. 
 
Reasoned proposal for 
Article 7 (1), fourth 
Rule of Law 
Recommendation 
 Political institutions stripped from appointing the National 
Council for the Judiciary. 
 Role of the Minister of Justice decreased. 
 Dialogue relaunched. 
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The limited impact of the Commission’s actions is reflected in the communication of the 
actors, which refers to a lack of interest for cooperation from Poland. The dialogue 
between Brussels and Warsaw was rather constructive in the beginning but developed 
into a confrontation by 2017. The first letter got a friendly response from the Deputy 
Foreign Minister as he thanked Timmermans and added: “Let me also take liberty of 
wishing you Merry Christmas and successful performance of your duties, as determined 
by the EU Treaties.” (Polish MFA 2015b). There were working meetings between the 
parties and although Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski said he found the 
information exchange to be inadequate, Warsaw expressed interest for dialogue and 
invited Timmermans for a visit (Polish MFA 2016a; 2016c).  
However, there was practically no dialogue in 2017 as the issue area was widened and 
attacks turned personal. The relations became increasingly tense after the second 
Recommendation in December 2016, when the Commission and Timmermans 
personally, was blamed for stigmatisation and political bias (Polish MFA 2017a). The 
MFA expressed its regret that the reforms were “abused by domestic and foreign 
opposition in the ongoing political fight” (Polish MFA 2017a). Warsaw claimed the 
Commission was using ultimatums to set the agenda for talks and said it would only enter 
a dialogue if state sovereignty was respected (Polish MFA 2017b; 2017c). Polish 
Government sent two letters demanding clarifications from the Commission and then 
published responses accusing Timmermans of copying the same arguments (Polish MFA 
2017d). The tone of the exchange also shifted from the side of the Commission as 
Timmermans not only addressed the judicial reform, but also referred to journalists being 
intimidated, adding “this is not how it works in a free society.” (European Commission 
2017c).  
The Reasoned Proposal for Article 7 has had the biggest effect on Poland since Warsaw 
has again shown willingness for dialogue. Yet, it has coincided with little initiative for 
compliance. There was a symbolic government reshuffle in Warsaw and the new cabinet 
has been more open for dialogue with Brussels. On December 8, 2017, Mateusz 
Morawiecki replaced Beata Szydło as the Prime Minister (The Chancellery of the Prime 
Minister 2017). A month later, Morawiecki dismissed a third of his Cabinet, including 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had been critical towards the Commission and its 
Vice-President (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2018b). The new Prime Minister 
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and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have gone to Brussels to discuss rule of law, 
supposedly on Polish initiative (Polish MFA 2018b; 2018c). According to the statements, 
the meetings have taken place “in a friendly atmosphere” (European Commission 2018). 
The goal of Warsaw might have been to improve the relationship with Brussels, but not 
to change direction. The reform has carried on and the new Foreign Minister reaffirmed 
the Polish Government will not “back out of the reforms” (Polish MFA 2018c).  
Throughout the process, Poland has confirmed its respect for the principal of rule of law 
and the fundamental values of the European Union (e.g. Polish MFA 2016b; The 
Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2018a). However, it has used three main arguments to 
refrain from changing the direction of the reform, all of which attempt to undermine the 
legitimacy of the Commission and its actions. First, Warsaw has claimed there is no 
problem and the Commission does not understand the content and the context of the 
reform. Second, Poland has argued the Commission has no right to intervene in this matter 
as judiciary is a competence of the member states. Thirdly, it has claimed the rule of law 
process is politically motivated and a personal mission of Vice-President Timmermans.  
The Polish Government does not see a misfit with the principle of rule of law and argues 
the reform is meant to fix the ills that have long characterised its judicial system. At least 
rhetorically, there is no pressure for rule adoption since the rules do not differ on the state 
level. Warsaw has repeatedly disagreed with the assessments of the Commission, arguing 
they are based on incomplete knowledge and are, as a consequence, unwarranted and 
groundless (Polish MFA 2016b; 2016c). For example, in its statement the MFA has said: 
“So, we regret to note that the Commission Recommendation is an expression of 
incomplete knowledge about how the legal system and the Constitutional Tribunal 
operate in Poland.” (Polish MFA 2016b). In the White Paper, Poland repeated its main 
arguments to justify the need for reform, claiming it 1) increases the low public trust in 
the judiciary, 2) increases the efficiency and speed of proceedings, 3) accounts for the 
Communist past and eliminates judges who had supported the undemocratic regime, 4) 
balances power and increases the accountability of the judiciary (The Chancellery of the 
Prime Minister 2018a). Moreover, Warsaw drew comparisons with the practices in other 
EU member states arguing the same practices are used elsewhere without problems (The 
Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2018a).   
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Poland has claimed the Commission has not been conferred with the power to interfere 
on the matter. Warsaw has questioned the appropriateness and legitimacy of the actions 
of the Commission and referred the Commission is attempting to increase its influence. 
Despite friendly exchanges in Brussels, presenting the Polish Foreign Policy Priorities in 
2018, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: “the Commission is not a supra-
government, and the European Parliament is not a supra-parliament empowered to 
instruct national governments and parliaments” (Polish MFA 2018c). Poland has 
repeatedly underscored the principle of subsidiarity, respect for sovereignty and national 
identity in the dialogue (Polish MFA 2016b; 2017a). It has reiterated the right to shape 
its own judicial system and expressed that “the right to introduce its own sovereign 
institutional solutions concerning the judiciary is a pillar of each national constitutional 
system in Europe.” (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2018a). Warsaw has also 
referred to the democratic deficit of the EU (Polish MFA 2018c). At the same time, it has 
emphasized the democratic mandate of the Polish government, justifying the reform by 
saying: “We owe it to our voters, this is what society expects of us. “(Polish MFA 2017e).  
Warsaw has framed the issue to be political and personally about Vice-President 
Timmermans. Poland has referred to the partiality of the Commission (Polish MFA 
2017b; 2018d). It has accused the Commission of “far-reaching arbitrariness in its choice 
of opinions on which it bases its reservations” (Polish MFA 2017b). The Foreign Minister 
has claimed the Commission is “an instrument in the hands of some States” (MFA 2018c). 
The Foreign Ministry also stated: “There is no place for any ‘personal mission’ on the 
part of the Commission Vice-President” (Polish MFA 2017c). In addition, the MFA 
summoned the head of the Commission representation in Warsaw over a rule of law 
analysis, which referred to intimidation and persecutions of judges as well as to “damaged 
brakes”. The Foreign Ministry considered it to be defamatory and questioned the 
reliability of other information provided to the Commission (Polish MFA 2017f).  
The case study also reflects that although the Rule of Law Framework is a concrete 
measure the Commission has at its disposal in the protection of values, the power to 
interfere in other matters is limited. The concerns about the respect of fundamental values 
in Poland are not only about the principle of rule of law, even though it is an important 
element in preventing backsliding on the values in general. Due to the hindrance on 
constitutional review, other laws have been quickly passed. The Commission has also 
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engaged in a dialogue about the media law in Poland and launched an infringement case 
against Warsaw regarding logging in the protected Bialowieza Forest, on which Poland 
did not follow the interim measures issued by the Court of Justice (European Commission 
2016j; 2017i). The limited reaction capacity is also apparent in the fact that despite the 
wide-ranging area of concerns, the infringement procedure could only be launched on the 
grounds of gender discrimination, implying the difficulty in operationalising the values 
stated in the Treaties. 
2.4. Application of the models of Europeanisation  
The models of rule adoption by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) provide the 
framework for analysis but their explanation power remains weak in the sense that rule 
adoption has been minimal despite the relevance of key characteristics of the models. 
Hence, the elements of the model exist, but rule adoption has not followed. Still, all 
models offer a different insight into the obstacles of rule adoption. Especially when the 
factors conducing or hindering the transfer as introduced by Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2005), are analysed as well. The strategy of the Commission has followed 
the mechanisms explained by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier by combining social 
learning and external incentives to evoke change, leaning more towards incentives after 
dialogue failed to produce results. At the same time, changes have mainly been a result 
of domestic debate. 
The attempts of the Commission to consistently engage in dialogue refer to the central 
role of the Commission and the model of social learning. The Commission has applied 
the model throughout the period but it was the most prevalent in the beginning of the 
process when the focus was exclusively on dialogue and persuasion. Timmermans has 
continuously emphasized the “objective is not the imposition of sanctions or resorting to 
Article 7” (European Commission 2017i). The Commission started the process by 
confirming its aim was to clarify facts and reiterated its commitment to constructive 
dialogue even after the relations had deteriorated (European Commission 2016a; 2017h; 
2017i). The Rule of Law Framework itself is a tool for enhancing social learning as it was 
created with the aim of conducing a transparent and constructive dialogue and preventing 
turning to sanctions and other negative incentives.  
Applicable to social learning, the Commission has aimed to persuade Poland of the 
appropriateness of the principle of rule of law. It has repeatedly stated the EU is a “union 
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of values” and rule of law is one of them (e.g. European Commission 2016a; 2016h; 
2016k). Timmermans has argued one can “never use democracy as an argument against 
rule of law” (European Commission 2016j), moreover, the Commission has stated it is in 
the interest of Polish citizens to protect this principle (European Commission 2017j). The 
Commission has justified its involvement by expressing that rule of law is not only a 
domestic matter but the basis of trust and cooperation between the member states and a 
necessary precondition for the operation of the single market (European Commission 
2016j; 2017i). It has further aimed to convince Poland on the legitimacy of the rule by 
expressing the “concerns are shared widely” by other international organisations 
(European Commission 2017i).  
The attempt of the Commission to evoke rule adoption through social learning is hindered 
due to lack of legitimacy and sense of identity. Although the principle of rule of law has 
been introduced in the Treaties in a legitimate way, it is a broad concept and its 
operationalisation by the Commission has not been seen as legitimate by Poland. The 
Commission has based the interpretation of the norm on the case law and documents of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Council of Europe (European Commission 2016a) but Warsaw has referred to an 
inconsistent application of the rule by claiming the member states are “unequal before the 
law” and “double standards” apply (Polish MFA 2018d). 
In addition, it can be implied that the sense of identity with the EU is eroding as Warsaw 
does not pursue its approval. Although Poland has high public support for EU 
membership and has expressed a strong EU to be its goal, the Foreign Minister has stated: 
“We feel a growing willingness within the Visegrád Group to advance our common 
interests.” (Polish MFA 2018d). The Visegrád countries have been in confrontation with 
the Commission and shown Eurosceptic tendencies. Based on its annual overviews of 
foreign policy priorities, criticism towards Brussels is also gaining ground in Warsaw 
(Polish MFA 2016d; 2017g; 2018d). Furthermore, Poland has emphasized its foreign 
policy has changed and Poland’s “broadly defined interests come first” (Polish MFA 
2017g).  
In the model of external incentives, the Commission fully relies on negative incentives, 
but they are not quick enough to stimulate compliance. The Rule of Law Framework is 
based on negative conditionality, there are no rewards the Commission can offer to 
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Poland. Despite formally non-binding, the underlying context of Rule of Law 
Recommendations is the fact that they are a prelude to the process of Article 7. The 
Commission has been setting deadlines for Poland to meet the concerns and prevent 
Brussels from proceeding with actual sanctions. The deadlines have become shorter in 
every recommendation, shrinking from three months to one, thus increasing the pressure 
on Poland. However, although the Commission has set clear conditions to Poland, 
potential sanctions remain too far in the future. The Commission has been in contact with 
Poland for about two and a half years; imposing sanctions under Article 7 would mean 
invoking Article 7(2), which has not even been proposed at this point.  
Poland has used bargaining and cost-benefit analysis and this explains its non-compliance 
with the proposals from Brussels. The costs for Poland are not credible enough to evoke 
change. Poland has continued to argue against the assessments by the Commission and 
attempts to bargain by claiming there is no problem nor need for action. Warsaw is 
considering the cost-benefit analysis for rule adoption by assessing the likelihood of 
sanctions. Minister of Foreign Affairs has expressed gratitude towards Hungary for their 
“solidarity in the dispute with the Commission” (Polish MFA 2018d), hinting at the 
promise of the Hungarian Prime Minister to vote against evoking Article 7 on Poland 
(Wright 2017). This implies Poland is prepared and ready to find allies for blocking the 
vote.  
Another factor decreasing the credibility of the EU is its high stakes in the process. 
Warsaw has expressed moving forward with the process would threaten the authority of 
the Commission (Polish MFA 2016e, 2017e). It is aware the Commission risks 
undermining the process of Article 7 if the final vote fails and might refrain from reaching 
that point altogether. Moreover, Poland has referred the actions “may strengthen anti-
European sentiment” (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2018a), which is something 
the Commission has to consider in order not to achieve the opposite of its goal. However, 
Poland has repeatedly expressed its opposition to linking the process with allocations 
from the EU budget, also through bilateral channels (Polish MFA 2017h; 2018d). Foreign 
Minister Czaputowicz has expressed it is “contrary to EU law and goes against the aims 
of Cohesion Policy,” (Polish MFA 2018c). This indicates budgetary methods might prove 
effective and could be used by the Commission to increase the potential costs for Poland.  
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The model of lesson-drawing best explains the absence of rule adoption. There is no 
domestic interest in changing the status quo, no matter the action of the Commission. On 
the opposite, the reforms were started because the new government was not satisfied with 
the situation at the time of taking office. As assessed above (see page 23), changes have 
most likely been a result of domestic debate as the opposition is also critical towards the 
reform (Polish MFA 2017d). Domestic debate is also reflected on the setting up of an 
expert group, the vetoes of the President and the Government-initiated campaign “Fair 
Courts” for increasing social support for the reform (European Commission 2017a, 13). 
The lack of change indicates the veto power of the opponents of the reform is limited. 
Warsaw itself refers to lesson-drawing by claiming that most practices introduced exist 
in other member states as well (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2018a). The model 
should be further analysed focusing on domestic debate. 
Table 6. Models of Europeanisation and the obstacles for rule adoption in Poland. 
Sources: European Commission Press Release Database, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Poland. 
MECHANISMS OF EUROPEANISATION 
External incentives model Social learning model Lesson-drawing model 
Characteristics 
 initiative of the 
Commission 
 obligations under 
Treaties 
 threat of Article 7 
 infringement 
procedure 
 deadlines 
 
Obstacles 
 lack of credibility: 
support of Hungary, 
high costs for the 
Commission 
 sanctions slow 
Characteristics 
 initiative of the 
Commission 
 information exchange, 
visits, support 
 acknowledgment of 
positive changes 
 normative arguments 
 reference to other 
international observers 
Obstacles 
 lack of legitimacy: 
mandate, inconsistency, 
operationalisation 
 low sense of identity: 
national, Visegrád 
 
Characteristics 
 little impact by 
the Commission 
 national policy 
 presidential 
vetoes 
 lack of interest to 
change status quo 
 information 
campaigns 
Obstacles 
 lack of interest of 
the Government 
 weakness of the 
opposing actors 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to study the capacity of the European Commission to ensure 
the fundamental values of the EU are respected in its member states. Over the last couple 
of years, there have been signs of democratic backsliding in some of the member states 
of the European Union. These tendencies challenge the concept of a “union of values” 
and give ground to ask whether the EU has the capability to safeguard democracy after 
membership has been granted.  
Motivated by the unprecedented proposal by the European Commission to launch a 
process on the risk of a serious breach in the fundamental values of the European Union 
in Poland, the author posed a hypothesis claiming the capacity of the European 
Commission to ensure the respect for the fundamental values of the EU decreases after a 
country has joined the Union. The European Commission was chosen to represent the EU 
as it has the role of the guardian of the Treaties.  
In order to test the hypothesis, a qualitative case study on the issue of rule of law in Poland 
was carried out. Official statements from the European Commission Press Release 
Database and the webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 
were used to analyse the dynamics of action and reaction of the European Commission 
and Poland. The author examined what actions did the Commission take to protect the 
rule of law principle and what impact did these steps have on Poland. Models of 
Europeanisation by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier were applied to the 
case to look for possible explanations for the established dynamics. The work of 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier on the favourable preconditions for rule adoption was 
used to offer explanations. 
The case study confirmed the hypothesis. Although the Commission has attempted to use 
social learning and external incentives, the impact on Poland has been limited. None of 
the recommendations of the Commission have been addressed, moreover, the scope of 
problems has widened. Despite continuously stressing the importance of dialogue, the 
Commission has turned to negative incentives as persuasion has not been successful. This 
has caused Poland to frame the issue as a political attempt to stigmatise a member state. 
The reasoned proposal for Article 7 triggered the relaunch of dialogue but Poland still 
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refuses to change course. It has referred to a lack of understanding, legitimacy and 
objectivity on the side of the Commission.   
Rule adoption is hindered due to low sense of identity, legitimacy and credibility. The 
approval of the Commission is not pursued as national and regional identity are becoming 
more relevant in Polish foreign policy. Warsaw has expressed doubt on the legitimacy of 
the actions of the Commission, stating the issue has not been conferred to the EU and the 
application of the rules is selective. Moreover, the Polish Government stresses it has a 
democratic mandate for the reform. Furthermore, the costs for Poland are not credible 
enough to evoke rule adoption. The sanctions are significant but their imposition is slow 
and highly unlikely due to voting rules. The risk of failing to carry out its threats puts the 
authority of the Commission at stake and undermines its power. 
The analysis implies a decrease in the relative power of the Commission once a country 
has joined the European Union and then falls back on the values. There are no benefits to 
offer and the costs are too unlikely to influence a country when there is no dissatisfaction 
or veto players on the state level. Based on the reactions of Poland, budgetary methods 
might be effective in evoking compliance. However, it would include a high risk of 
Eurosceptic sentiment and could only be legitimate if the rules are clear and the 
implementation consistent.  
The paper has given an insight into the strategies and obstacles of the European 
Commission in protecting the fundamental values of the European Union in its member 
states. This understanding is necessary in order to maintain a union based on values. The 
paper contributes to the literature on Europeanisation by adding the dimension of values 
and studying the member states instead of candidate countries. The results could be used 
to create appropriate measures for responding to democratic backsliding in the European 
Union. 
The research should be complemented by studying the actions of the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union to elaborate on the effect of socialisation and 
partisan politics. A comparative case study could be carried out to detect the reasons for 
the unprecedented escalation of the process. Also, domestic debate should be analysed to 
evaluate the relevance of lesson-drawing and look for the root causes of backsliding. 
34 
 
References 
Beyers, Jan. 2010. "Conceptual and Methodological Challenges in the Study of European 
Socialization." Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (6):909–920. 
Blauberger, Michael and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2017. "Can Courts Rescue National 
Democracy? Judicial Safeguards Against Democratic Backsliding in the EU." Journal of 
European Public Policy, 24 (3):321–336. 
Bulmer, Simon. 2008. "Theorizing Europeanization." In: Europeanization, eds. Paolo 
Graziano and Maarten P. Vink. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 46–58. 
Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. 2000. "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change." European Integration Online Papers, 4 (15). 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-015.pdf (February 27, 2018).  
Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. 2003. "Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of 
Europe." In The Politics of Europeanization, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. 
Radaelli. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57–80. 
Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union. 2012. Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 326/13, October 26. 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012. 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/47, October 26. 
European Commission. 2013. "The EU Justice Scoreboard a Tool to Promote Effective 
Justice and Growth." Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, March 27, COM/2013/160 final.  
European Commission. 2014. "A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law." 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
March 11, COM/2014/0158 final. 
European Commission. 2016a. "College Orientation Debate on Recent Developments in 
Poland and the Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers." January 13. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
European Commission. 2016b. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 
2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland, August 12. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016H1374&from=EL (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2016c. "Rule of Law in Poland: Commission Starts Dialogue.", 
January 13, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_WM-16-2030_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
35 
 
European Commission. 2016d. "Remarks by First Vice-President Timmermans and 
Commissioner Avramopoulos at the Readout of the College Meeting of 6 April 2016." 
April 6. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-1289_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2016e. "Commission Opinion on the Rule of Law in Poland and 
the Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers." June 1. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-2017_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2016f. "Rule of Law: Commission Issues Recommendation to 
Poland." July 27. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2643_en.htm (April 25, 
2018). 
 
European Commission. 2016g. "Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of 
Law in Poland: Questions & Answers." July 27. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-2644_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2016h. "Rule of Law: Commission Discusses Latest 
Developments and Issues Complementary Recommendation to Poland." July 27. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4476_en.htm (April 25, 2018).  
 
European Commission. 2016i. "Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of 
Law in Poland: Questions & Answers." December 21. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-4479_en.htm  (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2016j. "Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans 
and Commissioner Günther Oettinger – EP Plenary Session – Situation in Poland." 
January 19. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-114_en.htm (April 26, 
2018). 
 
European Commission. 2016k. "Opening Remarks of First Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans – Press Conference on Rule of Law in Poland." June 1. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2023_en.pdf (April 26, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2017a. Proposal for a Council Decision on the Determination of 
a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law, December 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49108 
(April 17, 2018).  
 
European Commission. 2017b. "European Commission Acts to Preserve the Rule of Law 
in Poland." July 26. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2161_en.htm (April 17, 
2018).  
 
36 
 
European Commission. 2017c. "Opening Remarks of First Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans: College Readout on Grave Concerns about the Clear Risks for 
Independence of the Judiciary in Poland." July 19. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-2084_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2017d. "European Commission Launches Infringement Against 
Poland over Measures Affecting the Judiciary." July 29. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-2205_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission 2017e. "Independence of the Judiciary: European Commission 
Takes Second Step in Infringement Procedure Against Poland." September 12. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3186_en.htm (April 25, 2018).  
 
European Commission. 2017f. "Rule of Law: European Commission Acts to Defend 
Judicial Independence in Poland." December 20. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-5367_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2017g. "Commission Action on the Rule of Law in Poland: 
Questions & Answers." December 20. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-
5368_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2017h. "Remarks of Frans Timmermans on European 
Commission Action to Preserve the Rule of Law in Poland." July 26. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-2170_en.htm (April 25, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2017i. "Opening and Closing Remarks of First Vice-President 
Frans Timmermans on the Rule of Law in Poland, at the European Parliament's 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs." August 31. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3042_en.htm (April 26, 2018). 
 
European Commission. 2017j. "Opening Remarks of First Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans, Readout of the European Commission Discussion on the Rule of Law in 
Poland." December 20. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-5387_en.htm 
(April 20, 2018).  
 
European Commission. 2018. "Statement Following the Working Dinner between 
President Juncker and Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki." January 9. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-18-86_en.htm (April 26, 2018).  
 
Featherstone, Kevin. 2003. "Introduction: In The Name of ’Europe’. " In The Politics of 
Europeanization, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 3–26. 
37 
 
Grabbe, Heather. 2001. "How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity." Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6):1013–
1031. 
Grabbe, Heather. 2014. "Six Lessons of Enlargement Ten Years on: the EU's 
Transformative Power in Retrospect and Prospect." JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 52 (S1):40–56. 
Harmsen, Robert and Thomas M. Wilson. 2000. "Introduction: Approaches to 
Europeanization." Yearbook of European Studies, 14 (1):13–26. 
Héritier, Adrienne. 2005. "Europeanization Research East and West: A Comparative 
Assessment Conditionality." In The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, eds. 
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 199–209.  
Kochenov, Dimitry. 2013. "On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance: Reverse Solange and 
Systemic Infringements Analysed." Polish Yearbook of International Law, 23: 145–170. 
Kochenov, Dimitry and Laurent Pech. 2015. "Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On 
the Commission's ’Pre-Article 7 Procedure’ as a Timid Step in the Right Direction." 
European Issues No. 356, Paris: Foundation Robert Schuman. 
McCormick, John. 2010. Europeanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2015a. "Minister Waszczykowski 
Requests Venice Commission’s Opinion on Constitutional Court.". December 24. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minister_waszczykowski_requests_venice_commission
_s_opinion_on_constitutional_court_;jsessionid=E06FFF3259EFC3A9E14EB394044F
D6CD.cmsap1p (April 26, 2018).  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2015b. "MFA Replies to Frans 
Timmermans Letter." December 24. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_replies_to_frans_timmermans_letter (April 26, 
2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2016a. "Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
Meets with Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans." April 6. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minister_witold_waszczykowski_meets_with_vice_pre
sident_of_the_european_commission_frans_timmermans (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2016b. "MFA Statement on the Polish 
Government’s Response to Commission Recommendation of 27.07.2016." October 27. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_statement_on_the_polish_government_s_response
_to_commission_recommendation_of_27_07_2016 (April 25, 2018). 
 
38 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2016c. "Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
Addresses Letter to First Vice-President of European Commission Frans Timmermans." 
March  2. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minister_witold_waszczykowski__addresses_letter_to_
first_vice_president_of_european_commission_frans_timmermans (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2016d. "Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
on Priorities of Polish Diplomacy." January 29. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minister_witold_waszczykowski_on_priorities_of_poli
sh_diplomacy (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2016e. "MFA Statement on Decision of 
the European Commission." July 27. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_statement_on_decision_of_the_european_commis
sion_1;jsessionid=61417CE4F375171C28EA001D9C9D9198.cmsap1ps (April 26, 
2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017a. "MFA Statement on Poland’s 
Response to European Commission’s Complementary Recommendation of 21 
December 2016." February 20. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_statement_on_poland_s_response_to_european_co
mmission_s_complementary_recommendation_of_21_december_2016_ (April 26, 
2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017b. "MFA Statement Following the 
European Commission’s Recommendation of 26 July 2017 Regarding the Rule of Law 
in Poland." July 26. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_statement_following_the_european_commission_s
_recommendation_of_26_july_2017_regarding_the_rule_of_law_in_poland_  (April 
26, 2018). 
  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017c. "MFA Statement." July 19. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_statement_1 (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017d. "Communique Following 
European Commission Reply to MFA letter." August 23. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/communique_following_european_commission_reply_t
o_mfa_letter  (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017e. "MFA Statement on the European 
Commission’s Decision to Launch the Disciplinary Process Against Poland Laid out in 
Article 7 of the TEU." December 20. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/news/mfa_statement_on_the_european_commissio
39 
 
n_s_decision_to_launch_the_disciplinary_process_against_poland_laid_out_in_article_
7_of_the_teu (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017f. "The MFA Summons Marek 
Prawda, Head of the European Commission Representation in Poland, to Provide 
Explanations over a Rule-of-law Analysis on Poland Submitted to the European 
Commission." January 23. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/the_mfa_summons_marek_prawda__head_of_the_euro
pean_commission_representation_in_poland__to_provide_explanations_over_a_rule_of
_law_analysis_on_poland_submitted_to_the_european_commission  (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017g. "Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
on Polish Diplomacy Priorities in 2017." February 9. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/news/minister_witold_waszczykowski_on_polish
_diplomacy_priorities_in_2017 (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2017h. "MFA’s Reaction Following 
Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern’s Interview to Frankfurter." July 28.  
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_s_reaction_following_austrian_chancellor_christia
n_kern_s_interview_to_frankfurter_allgemeine_zeitung (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2018a. "MFA Statement: Poland 
Responds to European Commission Recommendation of 20." March 20. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_statement__poland_responds_to_european_commi
ssion_recommendation_of_20_december_2017 (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2018b. "Deputy MFA Chief 
Accompanies Prime Minister During European Commission Meeting." January 9. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/c/MOBILE/news/deputy_mfa_chief_accompanies_
prime_minister_during_european_commission_meeting (April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2018c. "Talks with High-ranking EU 
Officials." February 9. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/news/talks_with_high_ranking_eu_officials 
(April 26, 2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2018d."Information of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy Tasks in 2018." March 21. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/ministry/minister/speeches/information_of_the_minister_of_f
oreign_affairs_on_polish_foreign_policy_tasks_in_2018 (April 26, 2018). 
 
Müller, Jan W. 2015. "Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law Inside 
Member States?" European Law Journal, 21 (2):141–160. 
40 
 
Olsen, Johan. P. 2002. "The Many Faces of Europeanization." JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40 (5):921–952. 
Radaelli, Claudio. 2000. "Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive 
Change." European Integration Online Papers, 4 (8). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-
008a.htm (February 27, 2018).  
Radaelli, Claudio M., and Romain Pasquier. 2008. "Conceptual Issues." In: 
Europeanization, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 33–45. 
Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2013. "What can the European Commission Do When Member 
States Violate Basic Principles of the European Union? The Case for Systemic 
Infringement Actions." Presented at the “Assises de la Justice”, Brussels. 
Scherpereel John A. 2010. "EU Cohesion Policy and the Europeanization of Central and 
East European Regions." Regional & Federal Studies, 20 (1):45–62. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2005. "Introduction: Conceptualizing the 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe." In The Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe, eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1–28. 
Schlipphak, Bernd and Oliver Treib. 2017. "Playing the Blame Game on Brussels: The 
Domestic Political Effects of EU Interventions Against Democratic Backsliding." 
Journal of European Public Policy, 24 (3):352–365. 
Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2017. "Political Safeguards Against Democratic Backsliding in the 
EU: The Limits of Material Sanctions and the Scope of Social Pressure." Journal of 
European Public Policy, 24 (3):337–351.  
The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. 2018a. "White Paper on the Reform of the 
Polish Judiciary.” March 7. 
https://www.premier.gov.pl/static/files/files/white_paper_en_full.pdf (April 25, 2018). 
The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. 2018b. "Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki 
Presented the Members of his Government." January 8. 
https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-
presented-the-members-of-his-government.html (April 19, 2018). 
 
Wright, Louisa. 2017. "Hungary Will Block Punitive EU action on Poland." Deutsche 
Welle, December 22. http://p.dw.com/p/2pp3H (April 24, 2018)
41 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Appendix 1. European Commission Press Release Database. 
Date Type Title Keywords Reference in 
text 
Available at: 
January 13, 
2016 
Fact sheet  College Orientation Debate on 
recent developments in Poland and 
the Rule of Law Framework: Q&A. 
College, Timmermans, fundamental 
values, CT composition, rule of law, 
democracy, treaty obligations, 
clarification, dialogue. 
European 
Commission 
2016a. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-
62_en.htm (April 25, 2018).  
January 13, 
2016 
Speech Readout by First Vice- President 
Timmermans of the College 
Meeting of 13 January 2016. 
Fundamental values, EU 
responsibility, media law, dialogue, 
cooperation, democracy. 
- http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-
71_en.htm (April 26, 2018).  
January 13, 
2016 
Weekly 
meeting 
Rule of law in Poland: Commission 
starts dialogue. 
Fundamental values, EU 
responsibility, Timmermans, 
cooperation, 
European 
Commission 
2016c. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_WM-16-
2030_en.htm (April 25, 
2018). 
January 19, 
2016 
Speech Statement by First Vice-President 
Frans Timmermans and 
Commissioner 
Günther Oettinger – EP Plenary 
Session – Situation in Poland. 
European Parliament, Timmermans, 
Oettinger, Constitutional Tribunal, 
dialogue, sovereignty, media law, 
democracy, objectiveness, 
obligation, non-partisan, Venice 
Commission, democracy argument. 
European 
Commission 
2016j. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-
114_en.htm (April 26, 
2018).  
April 6, 
2016 
Speech Remarks by First Vice-President 
Timmermans and Commissioner 
Avramopoulos at the Readout of 
the College Meeting. 
Warsaw visit, dialogue, publication, 
multiparty effort, urgency. 
European 
Commission 
2016d. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-
1289_en.htm (April 25, 
2018). 
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May 18, 
2016 
Press 
release 
College discusses a draft Rule of 
Law Opinion on the situation in 
Poland. 
Timmermans, dialogue, common 
values, opinion, CT. 
- http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-1828_en.htm 
(April 26, 2018). 
June 1, 
2016 
Fact sheet  Commission Opinion on the Rule 
of Law in Poland and the Rule of 
Law Framework: Questions & 
Answers. 
Fundamental values, EU 
responsibility, dialogue, media law, 
appointment, publication, CT 
functioning. 
European 
Commission 
2016e. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-
2017_en.htm (April 25, 
2018). 
June 1, 
2016 
Press 
release 
Commission adopts Rule of Law 
Opinion on the situation in Poland. 
Dialogue, EU foundation, 
appointment, publication, 
constitutional review. 
- http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2015_en.htm 
(April 26, 2018). 
June 1, 
2016 
Speech Opening Remarks of First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans - 
Press Conference on Rule of Law 
in Poland. 
Timmermans, common values, 
dialogue, advice, Prime Minister, 
political debate.  
European 
Commission 
2016k. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-
2023_en.pdf (April 26, 
2018).  
June 1, 
2016 
Weekly 
meeting 
College focusses on Invest EU, EU 
standards, Glyphosate and Poland. 
Opinion, CT, dialogue, treaties. - http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_WM-16-
2283_en.htm (April 26, 
2018). 
July 27, 
2016 
Speech Remarks of Frans Timmermans on 
European Commission action to 
preserve the rule of law in Poland. 
Business, citizens, dialogue, law of 
22 July, positive changes, 
constitutional review, prevention. 
European 
Commission 
2017h. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-
2170_en.htm (April 25, 
2018). 
 
 
July 27, 
2016 
Fact sheet  Commission Recommendation 
regarding the Rule of Law in 
Poland: Questions & Answers. 
Common values, EU responsibility, 
dialogue, CT, crisis, publication, 
undermining CT, Venice 
Commission, law of 22 July, 
improvements. 
European 
Commission 
2016g. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-
2644_en.htm (April 26, 
2018).  
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July 27, 
2016 
Weekly 
meeting 
Focus on rule of law in Poland and 
fiscal situation of Spain and 
Portugal. 
Dialogue, CT, constitutional review.  - http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_WM-16-
3722_en.htm (April 26, 
2018).  
July 27, 
2016 
Press 
release 
Rule of Law: Commission issues 
recommendation to Poland. 
Dialogue, law of 22 July, 
publication, undermining CT, 
Venice Commission. 
European 
Commission 
2016f. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2643_en.htm 
(April 25, 2018).  
August 12, 
2016 
Document COMMISSION 
RECOMMENDATION (EU) 
2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 
regarding the rule of law in Poland. 
Fundamental values, dialogue, 
appointment, publication, 
constitutional review,  
European 
Commission 
2016b. 
https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:32016H1374&from
=EL (April 25, 2018). 
December 
21, 2016 
Fact sheet  Commission Recommendation 
regarding the Rule of Law in 
Poland: Questions & Answers. 
Appointment, publication, CT 
functioning, CT president. 
European 
Commission 
2016i. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-
4479_en.htm (April 25, 
2018).  
December 
21, 2016 
Press 
release 
Rule of Law: Commission 
discusses latest developments and 
issues complementary 
Recommendation to Poland. 
Dialogue, positive changes, 
undermining CT, publication, 
Venice Commission. 
European 
Commission 
2016h. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-4476_en.htm 
(April 25, 2018).  
December 
21, 2016 
Weekly 
meeting 
Security Union, Terrorist financing, 
EU-Turkey Customs Union, rule of 
law in Poland. 
Recommendation. - http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_WM-16-
4504_en.htm (April 26, 
2018). 
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January 27, 
2017 
Document COMMISSION 
RECOMMENDATION (EU) 
2017/146 of 21 December 2016 
regarding the rule of law in Poland 
complementary to 
Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374. 
Fundamental values, dialogue, small 
improvements, appointment, 
publication, constitutional review, 
CT president. 
- https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELE
X%3A32017H0146 (April 
26, 2018) 
July 19, 
2017 
Speech Opening remarks of First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans: 
College readout on grave concerns 
about the clear risks for 
independence of the judiciary in 
Poland. 
Independent observers, European 
Parliament, National School of 
Judiciary, National Council for the 
Judiciary, Ordinary Courts 
Organisation, Supreme Court, 
constitutional review, appointment, 
publication, EU law, business, 
dialogue, EU citizens, infringement, 
article 7, personal attacks, 
intimidation of journalists. 
European 
Commission 
2017c. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-
2084_en.htm (April 25, 
2018). 
July 26, 
2017 
Press 
release 
European Commission acts to 
preserve the RoL in Poland. 
Article 7, infringement, Juncker, 
Timmermans, independence of 
courts, EU law, dialogue. 
European 
Commission 
2017b. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-2161_en.htm 
(April 17, 2018).  
July 26, 
2017 
Speech Remarks of Frans Timmermans on 
European Commission action to 
preserve the rule of law in Poland. 
Presidential vetoes, dialogue, 
independence of judiciary, 4 new 
laws, article 7, infringement, 
retirement age, gender 
discrimination, discretionary 
powers of Minister of Justice. 
European 
Commission 
2017h. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-
2170_en.htm (April 25, 
2018).  
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July 29, 
2017 
Press 
release 
European Commission launches 
infringement against Poland over 
measures affecting the judiciary. 
Infringement, retirement age, 
gender discrimination, discretionary 
powers of Minister of Justice, 
prolongation of mandates, 
Timmermans, invitation to Brussels. 
European 
Commission 
2017d. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-2205_en.htm 
(April 25, 2018). 
August 31, 
2017 
Speech Opening and closing remarks of 
First Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans on the Rule of Law in 
Poland, at the European 
Parliament's Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
Timmermans, European Parliament, 
presidential vetoes, for new laws, 
Bialowieza forest, clarifications on 
recommendations, Council, 
independent observers, dialogue, 
Prime minister invitation, value, EU 
law, non-partisan, independence of 
state, responsibility of EU, 
sovereignty, democratic mandate, 
respect, consequence to EU. 
European 
Commission 
2017i. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-
3042_en.htm (April 
26,2018).  
September 
2, 2017 
Document COMMISSION 
RECOMMENDATION (EU) 
2017/1520 of 26 July 2017 
regarding the rule of law in Poland 
complementary to 
Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 
and (EU) 2017/146. 
Constitutional review, judicial 
independence, international 
observers, Council, European 
Parliament. 
- https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELE
X%3A32017H1520 (April 
26, 2018). 
September 
12, 2017 
Press 
release 
Independence of the judiciary: 
European Commission takes second 
step in infringement procedure 
against Poland. 
Infringement, retirement age, 
gender discrimination, discretionary 
powers of Minister of Justice, 
prolongation of mandates, 
appointment and dismissal, 
European Court of Justice, 
dialogue. 
European 
Commission 
2017e. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-3186_en.htm 
(April 25, 2018).  
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December 
20, 2017 
Fact sheet  Commission action on the Rule of 
Law in Poland: Questions & 
Answers. 
Fundamental value, EU 
responsibility, dialogue, article 7, 
meetings, independence and 
legitimacy of CT, constitutionality 
of legislation, retirement, judicial 
cooperation, dismissal of judges.  
European 
Commission 
2017g. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-17-
5368_en.htm (April 25, 
2018).  
December 
20, 2017 
Press 
release 
Rule of Law: European 
Commission acts to defend judicial 
independence in Poland. 
Political control, breach of EU law, 
rule of law recommendation, 
infringement, article 7. 
European 
Commission 
2017f. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-5367_en.htm 
(April 25, 2018).  
December 
20, 2017 
Document Proposal for a Council Decision on 
the Determination of a Clear Risk 
of a Serious Breach by the Republic 
of Poland of the Rule of Law. 
Constitutional review, publication, 
CT president, ordinary judiciary, 
National School for Judiciary, risk 
of a breach of Article 2, 
international observers, European 
Parliament, internal market, judicial 
cooperation. 
European 
Commission 
2017a. 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroo
m/just/document.cfm?action
=display&doc_id=49108 
(April 17, 2018).  
December 
20, 2017 
Speech Opening remarks of First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans, 
Readout of the European 
Commission discussion on the Rule 
of Law in Poland. 
Independence for judiciary, 
separation of powers, international 
observers, Council, ordinary courts, 
National Council for the Judiciary, 
fundamental value, EU law, 
business, mutual trust, dialogue, 
article 7, European Parliament, 
citizens, EU interest. 
European 
Commission 
2017j. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-
5387_en.htm (April 20, 
2018).  
January 9, 
2018 
Meeting Statement following the working 
dinner between President Juncker 
and Polish Prime Minister 
Morawiecki. 
Prime Minister, Juncker, dialogue.  European 
Commission 
2018. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-18-
86_en.htm (April 26, 2018).  
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 
Date Type Title Keywords Reference 
in text 
Available at: 
December 
24, 2015 
Letter MFA replies to Frans 
Timmermans letter. 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Venice 
Commission opinion, 
Timmermans. 
Polish 
MFA 
2015b. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_r
eplies_to_frans_timmermans_letter 
(April 26, 2018).  
December 
24, 2015 
Statement Minister Waszczykowski 
requests Venice Commission’s 
opinion on Constitutional Court. 
Venice Commission's 
international prestige and 
independence, political 
controversies, importance of CT, 
stopping controversy. 
Polish 
MFA 
2015a. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minis
ter_waszczykowski_requests_venice_
commission_s_opinion_on_constituti
onal_court_;jsessionid=E06FFF3259
EFC3A9E14EB394044FD6CD.cmsap
1p (April 26, 2018). 
January 8, 
2016 
Meeting Konrad Szymański, Secretary of 
State, met with the Director of 
the EC Representation in 
Warsaw. 
Dialogue, communication, 
Secretary of state, COM 
representation. 
- http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/konra
d_szymanski__secretary_of_state__m
et_with_the_director_of_the_ec_repre
sentation_in_warsaw (April 26, 2018). 
January 29, 
2016 
Speech Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
on priorities of Polish 
diplomacy. 
Foreign Minister, strategy, 
sovereign states, community of 
values, EU crises, regional 
cooperation, EU unity, 
sovereignty, attacks in foreign 
media, active media diplomacy, 
empowerment. 
Polish 
MFA 
2016d. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minis
ter_witold_waszczykowski_on_priorit
ies_of_polish_diplomacy (April 26, 
2018). 
March 2, 
2016 
Letter Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
addresses letter to First Vice-
President of European 
Commission Frans 
Timmermans. 
Foreign Minister, Timmermans, 
judgements, publication, 
specification, objectivity, 
dialogue based on facts.  
Polish 
MFA 
2016c. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minis
ter_witold_waszczykowski__addresse
s_letter_to_first_vice_president_of_e
uropean_commission_frans_timmerm
ans (April 26, 2018).  
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June 4, 2016 Meeting Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
meets with Vice-President of the 
European Commission Frans 
Timmermans. 
Foreign Minister, Timmermans, 
dialogue, Venice Commission 
opinion, inadequate 
communication, expert group, 
Polish invitation, cooperation 
interrupted.  
Polish 
MFA 2016a 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minis
ter_witold_waszczykowski_meets_wi
th_vice_president_of_the_european_c
ommission_frans_timmermans (April 
25, 2018). 
July 27, 2016 Statement MFA statement on decision of 
the European Commission. 
Measures immature, COM 
authority, sincere cooperation, 
European standards, Venice 
Commission opinion. 
Polish 
MFA 2016e 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
statement_on_decision_of_the_europ
ean_commission_1;jsessionid=61417
CE4F375171C28EA001D9C9D9198.
cmsap1ps (April 26, 2018). 
 
 
October 27, 
2016 
Statement MFA statement on the Polish 
government’s response to 
Commission Recommendation 
of 27.07.2016. 
Non-binding recommendation, 
sincere cooperation, welcoming 
suggestions, dialogue, incorrect 
assumptions, groundless, 
detailed response. 
Polish 
MFA 
2016b 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
statement_on_the_polish_government
_s_response_to_commission_recomm
endation_of_27_07_2016 (April 25, 
2018). 
December 
22, 2016 
Statement MFA statement on the European 
Commission’s decision to issue 
a complementary 
Recommendation to the Polish 
Government regarding the rule 
of law in Poland . 
Dialogue, CT efficiency, 
European standards, new 
president, unfounded concerns. 
- http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE
/news/mfa_statement_on_the_europea
n_commission_s_decision_to_issue_a
_complementary_recommendation_to
_the_polish_government_regarding_t
he_rule_of_law_in_poland (April 26, 
2018).  
February 9, 
2017 
Speech Minister Witold Waszczykowski 
on Polish diplomacy priorities in 
2017. 
Foreign Minister, strategy, state 
interests, public mandate, future 
of the EU, regional cooperation, 
bilateral relations. 
Polish 
MFA 
2017g. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE
/news/minister_witold_waszczykows
ki_on_polish_diplomacy_priorities_in
_2017 (April 26, 2018). 
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February 20, 
2017 
Statement MFA statement on Poland’s 
response to European 
Commission’s complementary 
Recommendation of 21 
December 2016. 
Non-binding recommendation, 
suggestions welcomed, 
European standards, Venice 
Commission opinion, new 
president, sincere cooperation, 
dialogue, objectivism, 
Timmermans, stigmatisation. 
Polish 
MFA 
2017a. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
statement_on_poland_s_response_to_
european_commission_s_complement
ary_recommendation_of_21_decembe
r_2016_ (April 26, 2018).  
February 23, 
2017 
Meeting  The MFA summons Marek 
Prawda, Head of the European 
Commission Representation in 
Poland, to provide explanations 
over a rule-of-law analysis on 
Poland submitted to the 
European Commission. 
COM representation, media 
reports, defamatory behaviour, 
intimidation of judges, 
unacceptable communication, 
objectivity, reliability of 
information. 
Polish 
MFA 
2017f. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/the_
mfa_summons_marek_prawda__head
_of_the_european_commission_repre
sentation_in_poland__to_provide_exp
lanations_over_a_rule_of_law_analys
is_on_poland_submitted_to_the_euro
pean_commission, (April 26, 2018). 
July 19, 2017 Statement MFA statement. Democratic mandate, European 
standards, political fight, 
external interference, 
Timmermans, unfounded action, 
"personal mission", dialogue, 
ultimatums. 
Polish 
MFA 
2017c. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
statement_1 (April 26, 2018).  
July 26, 
2017. 
Statement MFA statement following the 
European Commission’s 
Recommendation of 26 July 
2017 regarding the rule of law in 
Poland. 
Ultimatums, dialogue, 
premature actions, partiality, 
public expectations, 
misunderstanding, international 
standards, national policy. 
Polish 
MFA 
2017b 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
statement_following_the_european_c
ommission_s_recommendation_of_26
_july_2017_regarding_the_rule_of_la
w_in_poland_  (April 26, 2018). 
 
July 28, 2017 Meeting MFA’s reaction following 
Austrian Chancellor Christian 
Kern’s interview to Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung. 
Structural funds, bilateral. Polish 
MFA 
2017h 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_s
_reaction_following_austrian_chancel
lor_christian_kern_s_interview_to_fra
nkfurter_allgemeine_zeitung (April 
26, 2018). 
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July 29, 2017 Statement MFA statement on EC's decision 
to launch infringement 
procedure against Poland. 
Infringement, retirement age, 
national policy. 
- http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
statement_on_ec_s_decision_to_launc
h_infringement_procedure_against_p
oland (April 26, 2018).  
August 8, 
2017 
Statement Letter of Polish Foreign 
Minister to European 
Commission’s First Vice-
President. 
Inaccuracies, legal basis, 
Timmermans. 
- http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/letter
_of_polish_foreign_minister_to_euro
pean_commission_s_first_vice_presid
ent_  (April 26, 2018).  
August 10, 
2017 
Statement MFA communique following 
reply from Commission First 
Vice-President to Polish Foreign 
Minister’s letter. 
Effectiveness of dialogue, 
Timmermans, clarifications, 
legal dialogue.  
- http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
communique_following_reply_from_
commission_first_vice_president_to_
polish_foreign_minister_s_letter_1 
(April 26, 2018).  
August 23, 
2017 
Statement Communique following 
European Commission reply to 
MFA letter. 
Interpretation doubts, 
journalistic wording, 
publication, Timmermans 
political. 
Polish 
MFA 
2017d 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/com
munique_following_european_commi
ssion_reply_to_mfa_letter  (April 26, 
2018).  
August 28, 
2017 
Statement MFA statement regarding Polish 
response to European 
Commission Recommendation 
of 26 July 2017. 
Sincere cooperation, dialogue, 
European standards, social 
expectations, groundless doubts.  
- http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/c
/MOBILE/news/mfa_statement_regar
ding_polish_response_to_european_c
ommission_recommendation_of_26_j
uly_2017 (April 26, 2018).  
November 
15, 2017 
Statement MFA communiqué following 
European Parliament debate on 
Poland. 
Parliament, premature, political 
pressure, migration, Bialowieza 
Forest, socially-sensitive issues, 
public assembly, stigmatisation. 
- http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_
communique_following_european_pa
rliament_debate_on_poland (April 26, 
2018).  
December 8, 
2017 
Statement  Position concerning the 
European Parliament’s 
resolution on the rule of law and 
democracy in Poland. 
National policy, EU standards, 
efficiency, EU interests, 
Bialowieza Forest, abortion law, 
extremism. 
- http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/n
ews/position_concerning_the_europea
n_parliament_s_resolution_on_the_ru
le_of_law_and_democracy_in_poland 
(April 26, 2018).  
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December 8, 
2017 
Position 
paper  
Position of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Polish side) on 
the European Parliament 
resolution on the rule of law and 
democracy in Poland. 
Constructive dialogue, values, 
appointment, publication, 
national policy, Minister of 
Justice, harmful conclusions + 
as above. 
- http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/9a5fe
89f-10ec-4707-8dba-
720479babd03:JCR (April 26, 2018). 
December 
20, 2017 
Statement MFA statement on the European 
Commission’s decision to 
launch the disciplinary process 
against Poland laid out in 
Article 7 of the TEU. 
Dialogue, mutual trust, burden, 
objectivity, negative information 
campaign, public expectation, 
European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). 
Polish 
MFA 
2017e. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/n
ews/mfa_statement_on_the_european
_commission_s_decision_to_launch_t
he_disciplinary_process_against_pola
nd_laid_out_in_article_7_of_the_teu 
(April 26, 2018). 
 
 
January 9, 
2018 
Meeting Deputy MFA chief accompanies 
Prime Minister during European 
Commission meeting. 
Prime Minister, Foreign 
Minister, Juncker, Timmermans, 
dialogue, Polish initiative, 
European Agenda. 
Polish 
MFA 
2018b. 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/c
/MOBILE/news/deputy_mfa_chief_ac
companies_prime_minister_during_e
uropean_commission_meeting (April 
26, 2018). 
January 22, 
2018 
Meeting Minister Jacek Czaputowicz 
meets European Commission 
Vice President Frans 
Timmermans. 
Foreign Minister, Timmermans, 
dialogue, Polish initiative, 
invitation to Poland. 
- http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/minis
ter_jacek_czaputowicz_meets_europe
an_commission_vice_president_frans
_timmermans (April 26, 2018).  
January 22, 
2018 
Meeting Talks with high-ranking EU 
officials. 
Foreign Minister, Timmermans, 
Bieńkowska, Jourová, 
Mohgerini, dialogue, 
continuation of reform, regular 
contacts, budget allocations.  
Polish 
MFA 
2018c. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE
/news/talks_with_high_ranking_eu_of
ficials (April 26, 2018).  
52 
 
March 7, 
2018 
White 
paper 
White paper on the Reform of 
Polish Judiciary. 
Public trust, inefficiency, 
communist past, balance of 
power, bureaucracy, European 
standards, demand from 
judiciary, lesson-drawing, 
national identity, Article 7, 
European unity, anti-European 
sentiment, dialogue.  
The 
Chanceller
y of the 
Prime 
Minister 
2018a. 
https://www.premier.gov.pl/static/file
s/files/white_paper_en_full.pdf (April 
25, 2018). 
March 9, 
2018 
Meeting Presentation of the White Paper 
on Polish Judicial Reforms. 
Foreign Minister, White paper, 
EU ambassadors, COM 
representation. 
- http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/n
ews/presentation_of_the_white_paper
_on_polish_judicial_reforms;jsessioni
d=589D63878B141033F05C74D6323
6A8EA.cmsap1p (April 26, 2018).  
March 20, 
2018 
Statement MFA statement: Poland 
responds to European 
Commission Recommendation 
of 20 December 2017. 
Public expectations, continuation 
of the reform, efficiency, 
independence of the judiciary, 
dialogue. 
Polish 
MFA 2018a 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_s
tatement__poland_responds_to_europ
ean_commission_recommendation_of
_20_december_2017 (April 26, 2018).  
March 21, 
2018 
Speech Information of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs on Polish foreign 
policy tasks in 2018. 
Foreign minister, sovereignty, 
EU crisis, support for EU, 
mandate of EU, principle of 
conferral, democratic deficit, 
double standards, structural 
funds, Article 7, public 
expectations, Visegrád group, 
Hungary. 
Polish 
MFA 
2018d 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/ministry/mi
nister/speeches/information_of_the_m
inister_of_foreign_affairs_on_polish_
foreign_policy_tasks_in_2018 (April 
26, 2018). 
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Appendix 3 
Appendix 3. Timeline of the events.  
Time of action Poland Commission 
Oct 8, 2015 Sejm nominates five judges to be appointed to the 
Constitutional Tribunal (CT), two to take office 
after the elections. 
 
Oct 19, 2015 General elections for Sejm.  
Nov 19,2015 Amending Law on Constitutional Tribunal - 
previous nominations can be annulled. 
 
Nov 25, 2015 All five nominations of CT annulled.  
December 2, 2015 Five new judges nominated by the new Sejm.  
December 3,  2015 CT rules the nomination of the two judges by the 
previous Sejm invalid. 
 
December 9, 2015 CT rules the nomination of the three new judges 
to be invalid. 
 
December 22, 2015 Sejm adopts amending the Law on the 
Constitutional Tribunal - functioning and 
independence of CT. 
 
December 23, 2015 Poland requests an opinion of the Venice 
Commission.  
Timmermans letter to PL asking to explain the measures taken to address CT 
judgements. Recommends asking Venice Commission. 
December 28, 2015 Law on Constitutional Tribunal enters into force.  
January 7, 2015 Reply to Commission on Media. COM: In December 2015 and January 2016, a number of particularly sensitive 
new laws were adopted by the Sejm, several among them through accelerated 
legislative procedures, in particular, Media Law, a new Civil Service Act, a Law 
Amending the Law on the Police, Law on the Public Prosecution Office. 
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January 8, 2016 Polish Secretary of State and Director of the EC representation in Warsaw meet. Appropriate Communication emphasized, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs claims not an explanatory meeting. 
January 11, 2016 Response to COM about CT reform. German 
ambassador meets Foreign Minister after 
Oettinger and Schulz express concern about 
Poland.  
 
January 13, 2016  Orientation debate in College of Commissioners. Assessing PL under Rule of 
Law (RoL) Framework. Information request to Poland by the College of 
Commissioners. 
January 15, 2016 PiS MEP-s launch a campaign "What is really 
happening in Poland" on Western Media. 
 
January 19, 2016 Poland writes to Commission on appointment of 
judges referring to constitutional custom.  
COM: between February and July numerous letters and meetings. 
March 9, 2016 CT rules law of 22 December to be 
unconstitutional. Government does not publish 
judgment in the Official Journal of the 
Government referring to the principles in the same 
law - no legal effect. 
 
April 5, 2016 Timmermans meets Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Justice, Deputy Prime Minister and President of CT in Warsaw. 
April 26, 2016 General Assembly of the Supreme Court adopts a 
resolution that the rulings of the CT are valid even 
if refused to be published by the government. 
 
June 1, 2016  Rule of Law Opinion to the Polish Government 
June 24, 2016 Government writes to COM acknowledging 
receipt of the Commission's Rule of Law Opinion. 
Informs and expresses conviction about new law 
that is being prepared. 
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July 22, 2016  Law on CT approved, not removing the concerns 
of COM, incompatible with the CT rulings and 
opinion of the Venice Commission.  
Comments and help offered throughout the legislative process of the law on CT. 
July 27, 2016  Rule of Law Recommendation, three-month deadline (Oct 27). 
August 11, 2016 CT finds provisions of law of 22 July 
unconstitutional. Government does not publish the 
judgement. 
 
August 16, 2016 21 CT judgements between April, 6 and July, 19 
published according to law of 22 July. Judgements 
of 9th of March and 11th of August not published 
as well as 16 judgements after August, 16. 
 
October 27, 2016 Response to RoL Recommendation: disagreement 
on all points. 
 
December 1, 2016 Law on the Status of Judges  
December 2, 2016 Law on Organisation and Proceedings  
December 15, 2016 Implementing Law  
December 19, 2016 President signs the three laws, appoints a  judge 
elected by the new Sejm to the position of acting 
President of the CT. 
 
December 20, 2016 Acting President of the CT convenes a General 
Assembly meeting an is presented as candidate of 
President of CT to the President of the Republic.  
 
December 21, 2016 Acting President of the CT appointed as the new 
President of CT. 
Second Rule of Law Recommendation, two-months deadline (February 21). 
January 20, 2017 Government announces reform of the judiciary.  
February 20, 2017 Reply to Second Recommendation: no agreement 
with COM assessment. 
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May 16, 2017  Council informed on Poland and calls upon COM to resume with the dialogue. 
June 13, 2017 Law on the National School of Judiciary 
published and in force.  
 
July 13, 2017  Letter to Warsaw expressing concerns about new laws. Polish Foreign and 
Justice Minister invited to meet in Brussels (invitation ignored). 
July 14, 2017 Response to COM letter reiterating previous 
explanations.  
 
July 19, 2017 Letter requesting specifications.   
July 24, 2017  President vetoes Law on the Supreme Court and 
Law on the National Council of Judiciary. 
 
July 25, 2017 President signs Law on the Ordinary Courts 
Organisation. 
 
July 26, 2017  Third Rule of Law Recommendation, one-month deadline (Aug 26). Threat 
of infringement and Article 7 (1). 
July 28, 2017 Law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation 
published. 
Response to letters of 14th and 19th of July. Timmermans invites Minister of 
Justice and Minister of Foreign Affairs to Brussels . 
July 29, 2017  Letter of Formal Notice, one-month deadline (August 29) 
August 4, 2017 Request of clarification to COM.   
August 8, 2017  Response to letter from the 4th of August. 
August 16, 2017 Request of clarification to COM.   
August 21, 2017  Response to letter from the 16th of August. 
August 28, 2017 Reply to Commission on third Recommendation 
disagreeing with everything. No actions. 
 
September 11, 2017 Polish Government initiates  "Fair Courts" 
campaign to increase social support for judicial 
reform. 
 
September 12, 2017  Reasoned proposal for infringement procedure. 
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September 13, 2017 Minister of Justice starts exercising the power of 
dismissing court presidents and vice-presidents. 
 
September 26, 2017 President transmits two new draft laws to Sejm on 
Law of Supreme Court and National Council of 
Judiciary. 
 
Dec 8, 2017 Two new draft laws adopted by the Sejm. New 
Prime Minister appointed. 
 
Dec 15, 2017 Law on the Supreme Court and Law on the 
National Council of the Judiciary approved by the 
Senate. 
 
Dec 20, 2017  1) Reasoned proposal for Article 7(1). Three-month deadline for withdrawal (20 
March). 2) Taking PL to Court 3) 4th Rule of Law Recommendation. 
January 9, 2018 Government reshuffle in Poland. Jean Claude Juncker meets Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki 
March 9, 2018 White Paper on the Reform published.  
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EUROOPA KOMISJONI SUUTLIKKUS KAITSA EUROOPA LIIDU 
ALUSVÄÄRTUSI: ÕIGUSRIIGI OLUKORD POOLAS 2015–2018 
Kristin Saar 
Resümee 
Töö eesmärk on uurida Euroopa Komisjoni rolli Euroopa liidu alusväärtuste tagamisel 
liikmesriikides. Euroopa Liitu on loomisest alates kujutatud ühendusena, mis põhineb 
jagatud väärtustel. Väärtused, nagu demokraatia, õigusriiklus ja inimõigused on 
sõnastatud Liidu aluslepingutes ning seatud liitumistingimuseks. Kandidaatriikidele 
rakendatav tingimuslikkus ei ole aga kohaldatav liikmesriikidele. Viimastel aastatel on 
võimu tasakaalu Euroopa riikides kahtluse alla seatud, enim tähelepanu on pälvinud Poola 
ja Ungari. Poolas võimule tulnud Õiguse ja Õigluse Partei algatatud kohtureformid on 
loonud pretsetendi. Euroopa Komisjon esitas esimest korda ettepaneku käivitada 
õigusriikluse põhimõttele tuginedes Poola vastu alusleppe artikkel 7, mis sätestab, et 
riigis on tõsine oht Euroopa Liidu alusväärtuste rikkumiseks.  
Märgid alusväärtustest kaugenemisest seavad kahtluse alla Euroopa Liidu olemuse ja 
tõsieseltvõetavuse. Väärtuspõhise liidu alalhoidmiseks on vajalik uurida, milline on 
Euroopa Liidu suutlikkus oma liikmesriikides demokraatlike väärtusi kaitsta. Töö 
keskendub Euroopa Komisjoni rollile ning seab hüpoteesi, et Euroopa Komisjoni 
suutlikkus tagada Euroopa Liidu põhiväärtuste austamine väheneb pärast liikmestaatuse 
saavutamist.   
Hüpoteesi tõestamiseks viib autor läbi kvalitatiivse juhtumianalüüsi õigusriikluse 
olukorrast Poolas ning sellega kaasnenud läbirääkimisprotsessist Euroopa Komisjoniga. 
Uuritud periood algab Õiguse ja Õigluse võimule saamisega 2015. aasta 19. oktoobril 
ning lõppeb pärast Komisjoni viimast Poolale seatud tähtaega. Uurimus tugineb 
euroopastumise lähenemisele, mis uurib normide ülekandumist Euroopa Liidust riiklikule 
tasandile. Teoreetiline raamistik põhineb peamiselt Frank Schimmelfennigil ja Ulrich 
Sedelmeieril, kes on loonud euroopastumise mudelid ja sõnastanud tegurid, mis 
soodustavad reeglite vastu võtmist.  
Juhtumiuuring viiakse läbi kolmes etapis. Esmalt koostab autor ajajoone olulisematest 
sündmustest uuritud ajavahemikul ehk uurib, millised Poola sammud on põhjustanud 
Komisjoni reaktsiooni ning milliseid meetmeid on Komisjon kasutusele võtnud. Seejärel 
hinnatakse Komisjoni tegevuse mõju, vaadeldes tegutsejate vahelist dünaamikat ning 
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Poolas esile kutsutud muutusi. Viimaks analüüsitakse toimijate strateegiat rakendades 
Schimmelfennigi ja Sedelemeieri euroopastumise mudeleid ning esitatakse kujunenud 
olukorrale võimalikud seletused.  
Juhtumiuuringu teostamiseks viiakse läbi dokumendianalüüs, kasutades Euroopa 
Komisjoni pressiteadete andmebaasi ja Poola Välisministeeriumi kodulehekülge. 
Mõlemal leheküljel viiakse uurimisperioodis läbi otsing võtmesõnadega „Poland“ ja 
„European Commission“. Seejärel eristab autor õigusriikluse põhimõtte järgimisega 
seotud pressiteated. Euroopa Komisjoni puhul lisatakse valimisse ka Komisjoni 
ametlikud soovitused ning Poola puhul välisministri ettekanded Poola välispoliitika 
prioriteetidest, kuna need aitavad selgitada tegutsejate käitumisloogikat. Valimi 
moodustab 31 dokumenti Komisjonilt ja 31 dokumenti Poola Välisministeeriumilt ehk 
kokku analüüsitakse 62 dokumenti.  
Juhtumiuuring kinnitab püstitatud hüpoteesi. Euroopa Komisjon on Poola mõjutamiseks 
kasutanud nii sotsiaalse õppimise lähenemist kui väliseid stiimuleid, kuid see ei ole 
Poolale märkimisväärset mõju avaldanud. Brüsseli meelest on olukord Poolas halvenenud 
ning probleeme juurde tulnud. Poola ei ole Komisjoni soovitusi ellu viinud ning muutused 
on tulenenud pigem siseriiklikest tingimustest. Komisjon on järjepidevalt kinnitanud oma 
valmisolekut dialoogiks, kuid pöördunud aina enam negatiivsete stiimulite poole. Ehkki 
ettepanek käivitada artikkel 7 tõi kaasa dialoogi taaskäivitamise, ei ole Varssavi nõus 
reforme peatama ning väidab, et Komisjon ei saa aru reformi sisust, ei ole objektiivne ega 
oma sekkumiseks legitiimsust.  
Analüüsi põhjal takistab normi ülekandumist ja Komisjoni võimekust seda soosida nõrk 
euroopa identiteet ning Komisjoni madal legitiimsus ja usutavus. Poola välispoliitikas on 
olulisemaks muutunud rahvuslik ja regionaalne identiteet ning Euroopa Liidu tunnustus 
ei ole moraalseks mõjuvõimuks piisav. Varssavi on kahelnud ka Komisjoni tegevuse 
legitiimsuses, viidates, et õigussüsteemi korraldus on liikmesriigi pädevus ning valitsusel 
on reformi läbi viimiseks antud rahvapoolne mandaat. Lisaks on Poola väitnud, et 
reegleid rakendatakse valikuliselt. Komisjoni usutavust vähendab sanktsioonide 
kehtestamise madal tõenäosus. Ehkki need on märkimisväärse kaaluga, on rakendamine 
kõrge hääletuskünnise tõttu vähe tõenäoline ning aeganõudev, mis tähendab, et Komisjon 
võib mainekahju ennetamiseks pingete eskaleerimisest hoiduda.  
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Juhtumianalüüsi alusel väheneb Komisjoni suhteline mõjujõud riikidele pärast nende 
liikmeks astumist. Vastupidiselt liitumisprotsessile on Komisjonil võimalik kasutada 
ainult negatiivseid stiimuleid ning need ei ole piisavalt usutavad, et reeglite järgimist 
tagada. Arvestades Poola häälekat vastuseisu ideele siduda õigusriikluse põhimõte 
Euroopa Liidu väljamaksetega, võivad eelarvelised meetmed reeglite järgimist 
soodustada. Samas on sellise sammu puhul oht põhjustada euroopavastaseid meeleolusid 
ning valikulise rakendamise korral ka oht mõrendada liidu ühtsust.  
Uurimus annab Poola näitel ülevaate Euroopa Komisjoni strateegiast ja takistustest 
Euroopa Liidu alusväärtuste kaitsmisel liikmesriikides. Juhtumiuuring rakendab 
euroopastumise lähenemist kandidaatide asemel liikmesriikidele ning lisab ülekande 
protsessi uurimisse väärtuste dimensiooni. Tulemusi saab kasutada kujundamaks 
Euroopa Liidu vastumeetmeid demokraatlike põhimõtete kaitsmiseks liikmesriikides. 
Samuti on need aluseks edasisele uurimisele. 
Uurimuse täiendamiseks tuleks analüüsi kaasata Euroopa Parlamendi ja Euroopa Liidu 
Nõukogu tegevus, mis võimaldaks saada täielikumat pilti sotsialiseerumise ja 
parteipoliitika osatähtsusest. Olukorra eskaleerumise seletamiseks tasuks koostada 
võrdlev analüüs või laiendada analüüsi ka siseriiklikule tasandile uurimaks algpõhjuseid, 
mis väärtuste kahtluse alla seadmiseni on viinud. 
 
  
61 
 
Mina, Kristin Saar, annan Tartu Ülikoolile tasuta loa (lihtlitsentsi) enda loodud teose 
 
“The Capacity of the European Commission to Protect the Fundamental Values of the 
European Union: The Issue of Rule of Law in Poland 2015–2018”, 
     
mille juhendaja on Stefano Bragiroli, 
      
 
1. reprodutseerimiseks säilitamise ja üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemise eesmärgil, 
sealhulgas digitaalarhiivi DSpace-is lisamise eesmärgil kuni autoriõiguse kehtivuse 
tähtaja lõppemiseni;  
2. üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemiseks ülikooli veebikeskkonna kaudu, sealhulgas 
digitaalarhiivi DSpace´i kaudu kuni autoriõiguse kehtivuse tähtaja lõppemiseni; 
3. olen teadlik, et punktis 1 nimetatud õigused jäävad alles ka autorile; 
4. kinnitan, et lihtlitsentsi andmisega ei rikuta teiste isikute intellektuaalomandi ega 
isikuandmete kaitse seadusest tulenevaid õigusi. 
 
Tartus, 18.05.2018 
______________________________________ 
 
